On the question of parliamentarianism Pt. 2

Il Soviet, May 2, 1920

III.

More difficult than determining when parliamentary activity can be used is to determine what the course of action of a communist fraction in parliament should be. (After all, the two questions are closely linked). One is routinely referred (most recently Radek. Die Entwicklung der Weltrevolution – The Development of the World Revolution – p. 29 to) the examples of Karl Liebknecht and the Bolshevik fraction in the Duma. But precisely these two examples show how difficult it is for communists to find the right path and what sum of extraordinary aptitudes it presupposes in communist parliamentarians. The difficulty can be expressed briefly as follows: the communist parliamentarian must fight parliament in parliament itself – and with a tactic, which at no time lies on the terrain of the bourgeoisie and parliamentarism. This is neither about protesting against parliamentarism, nor about fighting in the sessions, (all of which remain parliamentary, legalitarian, pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric), but about fighting parliamentarianism and bourgeois rule with deeds in parliament itself.

These revolutionary acts can have no other purpose than to ideologically prepare the proletariat’s move from the defensive to the offensive; that is to say, with these acts one forces the bourgeoisie with its social-democratic auxiliaries to uncover its class dictatorship in such a way, that it can become dangerous for the duration of the dictatorship itself.

Hence the communist tactic of unmasking the bourgeoisie in parliament consists not in verbal criticism (which in many cases constitutes empty pseudo-revolutionary phraseology, easily tolerated by the bourgeoisie), but in provoking the bourgeoisie to proceed openly, to uncover itself through action, which at a given moment may become unfavourable to it. Since parliamentarianism is for the proletariat a defensive tactic, it must be directed in such a way that the tactical initiative nevertheless remains with the proletariat, and that the assaults of the bourgeoisie become dangerous for it. (Engels certainly thinks of such tactics in his preface, so often misunderstood – in most cases deliberately – to Klassenkampfe im Frankreich (Class Struggles in France) when he says that the parties of order are falling apart together with the legal institutions they have created. His is undoubtedly the description of a defensive position).

I hope this brief and summary exposition has shown with sufficient clarity the great difficulties of such a tactic. The first difficulty, which confronts parliamentary groups almost without exception, is the following: actually managing to emerge from parliamentarianism in parliament itself. Because the most acute criticism of any action of the ruling classes remains mere wordplay, mere pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric, if it does not come out of the parliamentary arena, if it does not have the effect of igniting the real class struggle at that moment, of highlighting the class contrasts and thus the ideology of the proletariat.

Opportunism – the greatest danger of parliamentary tactics – has its ultimate roots precisely in this, that every parliamentary tactic, which in its essence and its effects does not go beyond parliament, or does not at least have the tendency to jump out of the parliamentary camp, is opportunistic. Even the most severe criticism, which is exercised within the parliamentary field, cannot change this. On the contrary, this leads to the opposite effect. It is precisely by making a severe criticism of bourgeois society appear possible within the confines of parliament that one contributes to the disturbance of the proletarian class consciousness, which is in the bourgeoisie’s desire.

The pretense of bourgeois parliamentary democracy boasts precisely that parliament appears not as an instrument of class oppression, but as the organ of ‚all the people‘. Since all wordy radicalism – through the illusion of its parliamentary possibilism – reinforces the illusions of the unconscious strata of the proletariat in relation to that illusion, it is opportunistic and must be rejected.

Parliament must therefore be sabotaged as such and parliamentary activity must be brought out of parliamentarianism. Assigned such a task to the parliamentary demeanour of the communists, another tactical difficulty appears, which, even when the danger of opportunism appears to have been overcome, is such in itself as to seriously undermine communist work. The danger consists in this, that in spite of every effort that the parliamentary communist fraction can make, the initiative and therefore tactical superiority always remains on the side of the bourgeoisie.

But tactical superiority gives the one of the contenders who has managed to achieve it, the possibility of forcing the opponent to fight under the conditions most favourable to himself. Now, it has already been demonstrated, that the limitation of the struggle to the parliamentary camp is a tactical victory for the bourgeoisie. So the proletariat in many cases is placed in the alternative, either to evade the decisive struggle by remaining on the parliamentary terrain: danger of opportunism; or to carry out the exit from parliamentarianism and the appeal to the masses at a time when this is favourable to the bourgeoisie. The most obvious example of the insolubility of this problem is offered by the current situation of the Italian proletariat. The elections, done openly under the communist banner and with agitation in grand style, have given the Party many mandates. But now, what to do! Either take part in the positive work of parliament, as Turati and the like wish, resulting in the victory of opportunism and infirmity in the revolutionary movement. Or openly sabotage parliament, with the consequence of coming sooner or later to a direct confrontation with the bourgeoisie, without the proletariat having the chance to choose the moment of conflict. Make no mistake. We don’t start from the ridiculous assumption that one can „choose the moment“ for revolution; on the contrary, we believe that revolutionary explosions are spontaneous actions of the masses, in which the Party’s only task is to give consciousness of the direction and aim. But precisely this spontaneity is compromised by the fact that the initial point of conflict lies in parliament. Parliamentary action either resolves itself into empty demonstrations (the repetition of which in the long run tires and numbs the masses) or succeeds in provoking the bourgeoisie. The Italian fraction, for fear of the latter eventuality, vacillates here and there aimlessly between empty demonstrations and the vague opportunism of pseudo-revolutionary phrases. (Alongside these tactical errors of method, however, substantial tactical errors have certainly also been made, so to speak: e.g. the petit-bourgeois demonstration for the Republic).

IV.

It is clear from this example how dangerous an electoral victory can be for the proletariat. For the most serious danger for the Italian party lies in this, that its anti-parliamentary activity in parliament can very easily lead it to overrun parliament – even though the proletariat does not yet possess the maturity of ideology and organisation that is necessary for the decisive struggle. The contrast between electoral victory and unpreparedness clearly illustrates the weakness of the argument in favour of parliamentarism, according to which it is a kind of review of proletarian forces. For if the votes obtained were truly communist, the previous observations would naturally fall, since it would mean that the ideological preparation is already done.

From this it also appears that electoral agitation does not escape doubt even as a simple means of propaganda. Communist party propaganda must serve to enlighten class consciousness. It must therefore be aimed at accelerating the process of differentiation in the proletariat as much as possible. Only in this way can we achieve, on the one hand, the qualitative development of the solid conscious core of the revolutionary proletariat (the Communist Party); on the other hand, that the Party through the objective lesson of revolutionary action attracts to itself the semi-conscious strata and leads them to the revolutionary consciousness of their situation. Electoral agitation is in this respect an extraordinarily dubious means. For not only is casting a vote not action, but, what is far worse, it is the illusion of action; and thus it acts not in the sense of forming the conscience, but in that, on the contrary, of obscuring it. The result is an army that is large in appearance, but at the moment, when serious resistance becomes necessary, it disperses completely (German Social Democracy in August 1914).

This state of affairs necessarily stems from the typically bourgeois nature of parliamentary parties. Like the entire organisation of bourgeois society, so too the bourgeois parliamentary parties ultimately aim, albeit rarely consciously, to obscure class consciousness.

The bourgeoisie, forming a tiny minority in the population, can only maintain its dominance by attracting all the materially and ideologically uncertain strata to its fold. Consequently, the bourgeois parliamentary party is the result of disparate class interests (although for capitalism the apparent compromise is always more relevant than in reality). Now, this party structure is also almost always imposed on the proletariat when it participates in the electoral struggle. The specific function of any electoral mechanism, which necessarily works for the greatest possible ‚victory‘, almost always acts in order to aim propaganda at winning over ’sympathisers‘. And even when this does not occur, or at least does not occur consciously, nevertheless there remains in the whole electoral technique a tendency to lure ’sympathisers‘ which conceals within itself the gravest danger: that of separating sentiment from action and thus arousing an inclination towards the bourgeoisie and opportunism. The Communist Party’s educational action on the inert and wavering strata of the proletariat can only become truly fruitful if it, through the objective teaching of revolutionary practice, strengthens revolutionary conviction in them. Any electoral campaign, in correspondence with its bourgeois nature, shows a diametrically opposite direction, which only in very rare cases can be avoided. The Italian party has also been subject to this danger. The right wing considered adhesion to the 3rd International and the call for the Republic of Workers‘ Councils as mere electoral phrases. The process of differentiation, the actual winning over of the masses to communist action can therefore only begin later, and probably under unfavourable circumstances. And above all the electoral phrases, by the very fact that they are not in immediate relation to action, show a marked tendency [MISSING WORD] towards the conciliation of contraries, the unification of divergent tendencies. It is these specific qualities (of electoral action) that must be taken into very serious account, especially in the present situation of the class struggle, in which it is a question of the real and active unity of the proletariat, not the apparent unity of the old parties.

V.

One of the almost insuperable difficulties of communist action in parliament consists in the excessive autonomy and independence that is usually attributed to parliamentary groups in party life. One can certainly understand that this is an advantage for the bourgeois parties, but this is not the place here to give a particular demonstration of this. (This question ties in with that of the advantages that are secured for the bourgeoisie by the so-called division of powers). But what is useful for the bourgeoisie, is almost without exception dangerous for the proletariat. So here too, if there is to be any hope of escaping the dangers inherent in parliamentary tactics, it is necessary for parliamentary activity to be subjected in its full extent and without limitation to the extra-parliamentary central management. This seems intuitive from a theoretical point of view, but nevertheless experience teaches us that the relationship between the party and the parliamentary fraction is almost without exception inverted, and that the party is drawn in tow of the parliamentary fraction. This was, for example, the case with Liebknecht during the war when he, of course in vain, appealed against the parliamentary fraction in the Reichstag to the obligations imposed by the Party programme (Klassenkampf gegenden Krieg [Class struggle against war], 53).