[GM104-105-106] The military question

The report at the Genoa meeting, with a discussion of Napoleon’s defeat, brought its coverage of the European wars of revolutionary France to a close.

Historians have always liked to speculate about how Europe might have turned out if Napoleon had won. But if from the purely military point of view the question might be worth asking, the fact is the conditions that had favoured the fortunes of bourgeois France and its emperor had changed quite considerably by 1815. In Europe the feudal world had been substantially compromised, even if bits of it survived here and there, and the bourgeoisie was everywhere expanding its dominion. If Napoleon had previously been their weapon he now had to be put out to grass; it wasn’t just a matter of preventing French expansionism, he had outlived his usefulness.

The Allies were preparing a substantial army of the various European powers, headed by bourgeois England and feudal Prussia, composed of around 800 thousand men. Napoleon meanwhile had only his Army of the North, composed of around 124 thousand men. And what is more, the English fusiliers were now equipped with the new Baker rifles, whose range was almost double that of the French.

Drawing on detailed accounts from both sides, the speaker gave an account of the Battle of Waterloo. Although grave miscalculations and errors of judgement were made on both sides, it was the mistakes of the French generals, not helped by the bad weather, which would be the main cause of the defeat.

Nothing went according to plan. The main French attack, which was conducted with waves of infantry and cavalry attacks, was neutralised by the accurate shooting of the English fusiliers and the counter-attack of the English cavalry. The French forces found themselves caught up simultaneously on three immediately adjoining fronts. Attacks and counter-attacks, objectives achieved and immediately relinquished, followed one after the after throughout the afternoon until the first French disbandment. Finally there remained only the Old Guard, which would sacrifice itself to allow the great general to flee the field of battle.

The death toll was 25 thousand French, 22 thousand English and 7 thousand Prussians; there were 7 thousand French prisoners.

In the course of the next two meetings the study went on to consider feats of arms during the American War of Independence of 1775-1783 (and usefully complementing part 2 of our ‘History of the American Labour Movement’, for which see this issue of Communist Left).

Two very different military formations clashed in this war. The English side was trained and organised but was lacking in motivation. The American side was recruited in a more haphazard way, and its commanders were often not up to the task; but the determination of the colonists to attain their goal would compensate for any mistakes and defections, which as a matter of fact consistently occurred on the other side as well. The training of the English troops, in accordance with the classic formulas of the 18th century, which were based on troop movements in open terrain against a similarly disposed adversary, proved clearly inadequate against forces organised for a guerrilla war. Indeed this is perennial unresolved problem: from the Roman legions in the Samnite Wars and in Spain, to the modern American army fighting in the Vietnam war, and on to Afghanistan today. Our modern, contemporary armies, which nowadays they want to scale down and consist of a few specialist mercenaries, are studying and experimenting with tactical schemes to meet this type of combat, which is currently taking place in the mountainous valleys of central Asia and on the plains of Mesopotamia and the Indus.

Something analogous might happen in the cities when the armed revolt of the proletariat finally breaks out; when the latter, not yet equipped with an army which is trained and prepared, might pass onto the offensive and begin using improvised techniques against forces which are trained in this type of combat, but which are nevertheless internally corroded by demoralisation and desertion.

The Thirteen Colonies had been planted in various different ways but all were bound to London by burdensome economic conditions.

England’s victory over France and Spain resulted in vast annexations and a rise in the duties and taxes which the colonists were expected to pay; another obstacle in their way was the Crown, which not wishing to expose itself further wanted to block any further expansion. The situation would get progressively worse until two years later war broke out.

Making up the army of the Thirteen Colonies Volunteers were the militia men (Minute Men), and troops and officers who had been trained in the English army. These together made up a fighting force of around 273 thousand men, along with over 120 ships. 15 thousand regular troops and around 60 ships would arrive later on from France, and 8 thousand regulars and 40 ships from Spain. There were also the Quebecois rebels and the native American tribes of the Oneida and Tuscarora. The English forces would end up with a total of 112 thousand men and 100 ships.

The English infantry were equipped with a smooth-bore flintlock musket known as the Brown Bess, with an effective range of around 250 metres, the French had their Charlevilles, whose effective range was only 100 metres but which would be rendered more effective by successive experimental modifications by American armourers (eventually resulting, many years done the line, in the famous Springfield 1795, the first significant weapon completely designed and produced in America). The colonists had their powerful Kentucky (or Pennsylvania) long barreled rifles, with an effective range of 370 metres, but they were extremely slow to reload. All of them were muzzle-loaders. The first breechloader, the Ferguson, was also used by the English, but it was an innovation that would take a long time to perfect, and not until the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 would the infantry on both sides be equipped with similar weapons as standard issue.

The report then referred to the first clashes between the improvised formations of the colonial rebels and the English army. The Americans were not yet ready to face the English in open battle, only to hit them with guerilla actions before falling back to their secure bases. The movement of English troops, meanwhile, was severely hampered by certain aspects of their military organisation. A commentary about this by Engels was read out.

Washington addressed the issue of organisation of his forces in terms of discipline and command structure, but above all he set up workshops committed to war production and of artillery in particular.

Fortune seemed to favour the English during most of the war, but the Americans received an unexpected boost after taking Fort Ticonderoga where they found 50 cannons, which they managed to haul back to the heights above Boston and use them to liberate the city. Boston, which lacked a loyalist population, was considered impossible to defend by the English and they evacuated the entire garrison of 6,500 men. This would last for at least two weeks, during which Washington didn’t give the order to attack. Both fronts, but particularly London, didn’t want to inflict serious damage on the opposition in case it might compromise future commercial treaties between the two sides. Thus Washington relinquished the opportunity to annihilate the English. He was worried amongst other things about the not insignificant number of minute men under his command: these were proletarians who, after having sparked off the initial struggles in defence of their working conditions, which were still as terrible as ever, were now armed and had developed a taste for victory after taking part in numerous battles.

In order to drive a wedge between the colonial forces there was now an attempt to take New York with a joint manoeuvre which involved 10 thousand English troops descending the Hudson River from Canada, and a naval assault on the city. On the 22 August 1776, 15 thousand English and German troops from the 35 thousand at Howe’s disposal, with covering fire provided by 500 naval cannons on 88 frigates, started their disembarkation in Manhattan causing havoc amongst the Americans. After 40 days of continuous skirmishing and a meeting between the two sides (called off by the English because of the Declaration of American Independence on July 4th) New York fell under English control.