General Party Meeting Under the Banner of Continuity and Clarity of the Revolutionary Message Pt. 2

(continued from no. 432)

The Organs of the Formal Party

The report entitled “The Organs of the Formal Party” was a series of short comments, following a series of quotes presented at the last general meeting.

The purpose of the exposition was to remind us that organic centralism does not provide any theoretical “recipe,” but rather indicates a way of working in and relating to the party.

It requires the party to behave in a unitary and international rather than federalist sense.

The party organs are constituted exclusively according to the current needs of the party.

There is no a priori form of the party that is always better suited to preserving doctrine than another. However, the organs must perform their function by taking into account only the tasks of the party. These, in turn, are determined by doctrine.  

The party will have moments in its life when it will have to have even secret activities, and implement military-type discipline.

This presupposes organic, even absolute and military discipline, but imposing military discipline when the conditions are not there is the path that opportunism in the party has always used to assert itself and its anti-party views.

It was also stated that the party does not need “great men” or leaders.

We do not simply mean the rejection of the idea that there are great men capable of advancing history by their force of will, which of course we already rejected with Marx.

Rather, we refer to those historical figures who have served as guiding lights for the proletariat and its vanguard, whose contributions have been great, but whose names are often abused.

This cult of personality has been a weakness of the socialist movement and has always manifested itself at times when the party was composed of heterodox currents and groups, with the admission of internal democracy.

Voting and leader arbitration were both used to resolve irreconcilable disputes.

These disputes were irresolvable because they stemmed from theories and objectives that were not our own.

This cannot be in our party today.

All “misunderstandings” or seemingly divergent opinions are easily resolved by the continuous study of our tradition, in which all the answers are to be found.

Although the comrades at the center obviously have the task of centralizing communication and linking the different parts of the organization, they do not have the right to make decisions about doctrine at will.

The party is guided by its continuous work of sculpting the theory of revolution and makes decisions organically. It  does not regard the center as a special source of will or knowledge.

The Military Question: Moscow Directive—First Phase, July-September 1919

After the decisive last victories over the four Red armies, Denikin assessed the conditions for the final attack on Moscow.

The “Directive No. 08878,” or “March on Moscow,” was an elaborate and complex maneuver basically divided into two phases.

The former phase established a fan-shaped advance of its armies to consolidate the flanks of the entire front and then converge the counter-revolutionary forces on Moscow through the vast area between the Don and Dnieper rivers.

A map was displayed to illustrate the theater of operations with the new arrangement of the White Army and their objectives.

Its commanders expressed strong doubts, mainly due to the reduced forces at their disposal and the need for control in controlled areas and the danger of riots, which could be dealt with an adequate mobile cavalry force.

Through general mobilization, Denikin’s forces grew from 64,000 to 160,000, hastily trained.

The Red Army had 116,000 inexperienced and inadequate cavalry units on the southern front.

It was necessary for the Red Army to put forward a suitable strategy, which emerged after a strong disagreement within its leadership.

After a change at the top of the sector command, it was finally decided to launch a counter-offensive along the Volga to recapture Tsaritsyn by moving reinforcements from the east.

The White Army needed about two months to consolidate the flanks of the front, after which their attack was successful and moreover accompanied by the breakthrough of the Cossack cavalry deep into the Red rear, resulting in the devastation of warehouses and stores.

The Red counter-offensive along the Volga halted the White advance, forcing it to retreat.

A Cossack revolt broke out in the Red rear, which was soon resolved. However, it blocked their maneuvers to conquer Tsaritsyn, which resulted in unsuccessful and heavy losses.

Another objective of the Red Army was the capture of Kharkov in the central part of the front through a pincer manoeuvre, which was disrupted at the outset by a rapid and effective white counter-move that drove the entire Red sector back.

The Red strategy on the Volga had, at the time, resulted in a partial failure. The White Army ended up controlling the fertile grain-producing regions and enjoying more credit and international support for the fight they were waging against the Bolshevik revolution.

CONCLUSIONS ON THE MILITARY QUESTION IN GERMANY 1918-23

In the final months of 1918, all the objective criteria for revolution were met. Yet, what was clearly lacking was an agent of “subjective change, namely, the ability of the revolutionary class to […] break (or dislocate) the old government.” (Lenin, the Collapse of the Second International.) In the absence of a communist leadership, the insurgent sailors were soon defeated.

In the Munich uprising of 1919, the Red Guards could not break out of the immediate environs of Munich, which was never more than a revolutionary island in a sea of Bavarian reaction; meanwhile the Communist Party had already suffered terrible defeats at the hands of Noske’s Freikorps, notably in Berlin.

During the Kapp putsch of March 1920, the social democrats were in the ascendant. The great mass of the working class wanted to prevent a return to militarist reaction of the old imperial regime. Once that threat was averted, the Communists were crushed in a White Terror.

In the March Action of 1921, the militant workers of the mining regions of Central Germany were soon isolated. A general strike broke out, and in certain regions this escalated into an armed insurrection. But it was only a matter of time before the Reichswehr and police defeated the uprising at huge cost to the miners and the Communist Party.

In the so-called “German October” of 1923, the situation was ripe with opportunities for a successful seizure of power, with Germany in a deep economic crisis and the German bourgeoisie powerless in the face of the French occupation. A series of strikes and the formation of Proletarian Hundreds in many parts of the country demonstrated that the masses were being “drawn both by all the circumstances of the crisis and by the ‘upper classes’ themselves into independent historical action”. (Lenin)

Yet it was only in the second half of the year that the KPD oriented itself towards insurrection, after the August strike wave, which brought down the Cuno government. Instead, the Party’s focus had been on opportunist tactics, notably the formation of so-called “Workers’ Governments” in the states of Saxony and Thuringia.

“One does not play with insurrection,” wrote Marx, but this is precisely what the KPD leadership did in 1923, which is not to decry the bravery of the Hamburg insurgents themselves.
Failure to subvert the armed forces and the police was a key factor in the collapse of the armed struggles. The bourgeoisie could always count on loyal troops to quell the uprisings in Berlin, Munich, the Ruhr, Central Germany, Hamburg and elsewhere. As Lenin wrote in Lessons of the Moscow Uprising (1906) “Of course, unless the revolution assumes a mass character and affects the troops, there can be no question of serious struggle.”

A brief history of the Ottoman Empire

The party has begun to analyze the historical and social development of the Ottoman Empire. We aim to elaborate upon the specific characteristics of the early period of the capitalist mode of production and, consequently, the historical peculiarities that determine the clash between social classes. Of course, the historical outcome of this clash can only be the universal class war that sees the International Communist Party at war with all other parties.

The Ottoman Empire was founded in the 14th century as a small Turkish principality in Asia Minor, between the declining Byzantine Empire and the Seljuk Sultanate.    

Thanks to its strategic position and skillful military and diplomatic policy, it rapidly expanded.

In 1352, it crossed the Dardanelles and settled in Gallipoli.

Under Murad I (1362-1389), Adrianople became the new capital.

Despite their defeat against Timur in 1402, the Ottomans enjoyed a new period of splendor under Mehmet I and Murad II, consolidating their control over the Balkans.

In 1453, Mehmet II conquered Constantinople and renamed it Istanbul, transforming it into the heart of the Empire.

In the following decades, Serbia, Bosnia, Crimea and other regions were conquered.

Ottoman success was based on a centralized state system that abolished feudalism and replaced it with an efficient administration.

The land was expropriated and managed by the State (miri), while the peasants paid lower taxes than under the previous Byzantine Empire.

Recruited from young Christian converts, the Janissaries ensured military stability.

The Ottomans presented themselves as protectors of the lower classes, integrating local elites as vassals (timar) and granting religious autonomy to Orthodox Christian. Thus, they gained their support against powers such as Venice and Hungary.

In the 16th century, under Selim I (the first Caliph) and Suleiman the Magnificent, the empire reached its peak.

The Ottomans exploited divisions between European powers, allying themselves with France and England and attacking the Habsburgs, conquering Hungary (1526) and besieging Vienna (1529).

However, structural problems began to emerge in the late sixteenth century:

1) Currency devaluation and increased military spending; 2) Impoverished peasants joined armed gangs (celali), destabilizing Anatolia; 3) Land passed into private hands (mulk) or to religious institutions (vakf), reducing central control; 4) Social mobility came to a standstill, with abuses by the askeri (military and religious elite).

Nomads (Turkmens, Kurds, Bedouins) were crucial to the economy, managing pastures, transport, and carpet production.

It was precisely because of their great economic efficiency that the Ottoman Empire was slow to develop a road network.

Furthermore, agricultural expansion reduced their territories, leading to conflicts with farmers and migrations towards Persia.    

The nomads, marginalized, often became rebels or mercenaries, undermining imperial stability.

The Ottoman Empire reached its peak in the 16th century thanks to a centralized system, skilled diplomacy, and pragmatic integration of ethnic and religious diversity.

However, from the 17th century onwards, economic crises, rebellions, and decentralization led to its decline, paving the way for subsequent defeats and reforms.