Introduction to the Left Purged and Into Exile

The following article, The Battle Against the Destruction of the Party, is part of the series on the History of the Left in Comunismo, our Review in Italian. Even though this article is self-explanatory, we are providing an introduction for English-speaking readers who may not have sufficient information on the history of the Communist Left and the relationship between the Left and Trotski(ists).

The Left in Italy grew out of the struggle against the First World War, providing the basis for the formation of the Italian Communist Party. The post-First World War period saw fierce battles by the Italian workers until forced onto the defensive by the twin forces of the Italian state and fascist auxiliaries. The original leadership of the Italian Communist Party was replaced because of arrests and imprisonment – Gramsci was the first Stalin-imposed leader placed on a Communist Party outside Russia. The struggle to defend revolutionary positions continued both inside the Italian Party, as well as within the international meetings of the Comintern. The Left, along with the first General Secretary of the Italian Party, Amadeo Bordiga, where first slandered and then expelled, under the difficult conditions of illegality. The names of those expelled were published in the stalinised press, inviting the attention of the Fascist state. But this was after the decisive events of 1926 when the conflict between the Left and Stalinism was out in the open.

The stalinists realised that the Left could only be dislodged by the virtual liquidation of the Italian Party itself, but first they tried to keep the Left out of the brewing arguments in the Russian Party. In fact the Left was offered the leadership of the Italian Party again in 1924, with its own policies, if it undertook to stay out of Russian internal politics. It was symptomatic of a process whereby the Communist Parties were being placed at the service of the Russian state through the International, rather than remain instruments of the World Revolution through the International. Wild about-turns had become a feature of Comintern policies, but an unprincipled alliance with Stalin (that is what such horse-trading would have been) was out of the question. We had seen plenty of examples of those who became the temporary exponents of Moscow’s policies, who were cast to one side when the next change of ’tactics’ became apparent.

A meeting of the EC of the Comintern took place in Moscow in February 1926 to which a delegation from the Italian Party attended. A part of the delegation was Bordiga, who had an opportunity to investigate the accusations against Trotski. At a private meeting between the Italian Delegation and Stalin on 22nd February Bordiga had the opportunity to probe out what the issues were behind the anti-Trotski campaign. We are quoting from the minutes of the meeting made available when the stalinist Italian Party opened its archives for historical research purposes. Those involved in this part of the discussions were Bordiga, Stalin and Ercoli (Togliatti). The meeting was discussing the evaluation of the events in Germany before proceeding to other matters:

BORDIGA: However the fact remains that Trotski made a comparison between the Russian October and the German October and criticised the weaknesses of those comrades in the new opposition. Then it was said that Trotski took a position against the old guard. Today the same accusations are instead brought by the C.C. against the opposition.

STALIN: The difference lies in this: comrade Trotski began with an analogy and constructed his entire critique on it. What was his goal? He wanted to change horses during the race without taking into account of the essentials. But one cannot build on an analogy. If one begins with an analogy one must end with an analogy. And this means to engage in literature, but not in political work.

BORDIGA; Trotski made use of the analogy to study the causes of the defeat we suffered in Germany in 1923. It wasn’t without historical significance to establish that the same men who had erred in Russia in 1917 were at the head of the International when the German revolution failed in 1923.

STALIN: But as far as 1923 is concerned Trotski is not right. The more extreme position on that occasion was taken by Zinoviev: and Trotski supported the Brandler group, which behaved uncertainly and changeably. In spite of this Trotski and Radek supported them.

BORDIGA: I don’t believe that the faith Trotski placed in Brandler would have been better placed in Fischer.

STALIN: Brandler certainly merits more trust than Fischer. It often happens however that a worthy man takes an erroneous position and that vice versa an unworthy man is found in the correct position. In politics the line of positions and not that of individuals must be followed (…)

ERCOLI: I ask whether the questions which have been discussed in the R.C.P. Congress involve perspectives concerning developments in the world situation.

STALIN: Our perspectives are those of the International in general.

BORDIGA: With the aim of clarifying the question of perspectives I ask whether comrade Stalin thinks that the development of the Russian situation and of the internal problems of the Russian Party are linked to the development of the international proletarian movement.

STALIN: This question has never been put to me. I would never have believed that a communist could put it to me. God forgive you for having done it.

BORDIGA: I ask then that comrade Stalin say what will befall in Russia if the proletarian revolution does not take place in Europe within a certain period of time.

STALIN: If we are able to organise the Russian economy well, it is destined to develop, and with it the revolution will develop. The program of our party says – on the other hand – that we have the duty to spread the revolution to the world by every means and we will do that (…)

BORDIGA: This collaboration should have taken place in the recent discussion. The questions dealt with by the Russian Congress ought therefore to have been dealt with in the present C.I. Executive.

STALIN: I must point out that these questions are essentially Russian. Besides the Western parties are not yet ready to discuss them. That’s why the R.C.P. Central Committee has sent the parties of the C.I. a letter which requests that the recent Russian discussion not be carried on in the other parties. This resolution has also been approved by the opposition and has been affirmed by the Presidium of the C.I. We have also done this to avoid the repetition of what came about in the preceding discussions with Trotski, which were carried on in some parties in an artificial and mechanical way.

BORDIGA: I don’t think that these arguments are decisive. First of all, if discussion on Russian questions was not wanted in this Executive, it should have been the Executive itself which decided this. Secondly, the problems which have been touched on in the Russian debate could not be considered exclusively Russian. They concern the proletarians of all countries. Finally the fact that the opposition has consented is of no importance.

On the same day as the private meeting with Stalin, Bordiga spoke to the full Enlarged ECCI. He took the opportunity to review the policies of the Comintern back to 1921, the Third Congress, the March Action in Germany and the united front tactics: from that time a catalogue of disasters, ’mistakes’ and about-turns. True, there had been some admissions that there had been errors, but that did not lead to any changes to Moscow’s policies. Indeed, it led to even worse attitudes: «After the October defeat in Germany in 1923, the International recognised that the mistake had been made. But instead of introducing a thorough change into the decisions of the Fourth Congress, all that was done was to hit out against certain comrades. Scapegoats had to be found. And they were found in the German Party. There was an absolute failure to recognise that the entire International was responsible».

Bordiga then went on to outline a balance-sheet of an even worse disaster – Bolshevisation! It had not yet shattered the Italian Party: that was to come in the next couple of years. As far as other parties in Western Europe were concerned, they were lifeless relics: the French party had not been able to put its affairs into a satisfactory state: the German party had been purged into oblivion: the British party was held to be a model party (only because of its lack of factions), but disaster was only months away, in the form of the General Strike. The Russian party itself was soon to be torn apart and submerged by the full tide of counter-revolution – stalinism / socialism in one country. Most of those at the sessions of the Enlarged ECCI who approved of the attacks against the Left, who joined in all the abuse and insinuations, were soon themselves to be attacked and ridiculed, marginalised and finally swept away in the purges.

Against all the hysterics from the centrists and the right, we refused to see the fate of the Russian Revolution as being mainly a Russian question. Its fate was intrinsically bound with that of the workers in the rest of Europe. The policy of Socialism in One Country (in fact, Socialism in none – especially in Russia) was for assigning the workers movement in Western Europe to defeat and destruction. It in effect sealed the fate of the Russian workers themselves, who would equally pay with lakes of blood for the abandonment of revolutionary perspectives.