In the War Hotbed of the Middle East

Following the retaking of a large part of national territory by the Damascus regime, the phase of relative stabilization of Syria has led to a temporary shift of the fault line separating the spheres of influence in the Middle East region. Outside the control of the Syrian Government only the north-western province of Idlib and the Kurdish region of Rojava remain. In this latter region there have been clashes with the Turkish armed forces. At the end of this phase, during which the support of Russian forces and Shiite militias linked to Iran has been essential, it is in Yemen where the maximum energy of inter-imperialist frictions is discharged.

Epicentre of a furious battle (which at the time of writing has not yet ended) is the strategic city of Hodeida on the Red Sea. This is situated 200 miles from the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb through which 5 million barrels of oil pass daily. The fierce battle sees the Houthi Shiite militias, supported by Iran, who control the western part of the country, clash with the Yemeni forces allied to Saudi Arabia, which receives military support from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

It is a collision between Saudi Arabia and Iran for the control of access to the Red Sea, and is of vital importance. As always, the Yemeni forces in the field are forced into partisanship, subordinate to the major powers. To dispel the journalistic legend which represents the Yemeni conflict as a war of religion that would oppose Shiites and Sunnis, supported by the Saudi orthodox champions, it is worth remembering that the leader of the land offensive against the Houthi is the Shiite Tareq Saleh. This is the grandson of the deceased Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, killed by the Houthi themselves after breaking their alliance and changing sides. Quite a clear sign that the interests at stake are very different from what simple ethnic and religious divisions would suggest. Meanwhile the clan of the Saleh, of Zaidite Shiite religion and at the centre of Yemen’s political life for 40 years, wavers between the two camps fighting for hegemony in the region.

Saudi Arabia’s commitment to the fight against the Houthi does not seem to have strong support from the United States. Riyadh’s claim to play a leading role in the determination of the price of crude oil has probably cooled down American enthusiasm for the military successes of her traditional Saudi allies, who have now penetrated deep into the urban center of Hodeida. The dispute over seizing portions of the oil revenue, always the subject of imperialistic appetites, takes on a central role at a time when the worsening crisis of overproduction is dissuading large groups of capital from investing in manufacturing.

This is how the US decision to cancel the international agreement on Iranian nuclear power, in order to reduce Tehran’s share of the oil revenue, should be regarded. Also in this light should be seen the decision of Saudi Arabia to cut oil production by 500,000 barrels a day to avoid a drop in the price of crude oil. But Trump reacted to this on 12 November by effectively ordering Riyadh to refrain from any attempt to pursue a policy of pushing up the price of the barrel, which would have the effect of stopping or slowing down economic growth which is already very sluggish.

The reintroduction of sanctions against Iran by the United States becomes a way of promoting US trade through other channels. Italy is exempted from the sanctions imposed on those who buy Iranian oil for a period of six months: is this in exchange for the multi-billion dollar purchase of the large F-35 patrol recently ordered? Moreover, the US administration is pressing for Italy to complete the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (“TAP”), falsely opposed in the electoral program of the 5 Star Movement. The TAP would allow the supply of Middle Eastern gas, reducing Italy’s dependence on Russia.The same applies to the development of Muos, the advanced satellite system for military communications in the Mediterranean installed in Sicily. The exemption from sanctions against Iran also concerns seven other countries: China, India, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Greece and Turkey; certainly in exchange there are equivalent counterparts in the American trade war on world markets.

The story of Jamal Khashoggi, the journalist savagely killed in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on October 2, has provided a pretext for Turkey and other ancient and stable allies of Saudi Arabia to express their disagreements and distrust towards the young and megalomaniac crown prince Muhammad Bin Salman. MBS is the expression of a particularly dynamic and fierce bourgeois faction, whose politics could harm the interests of the United States in the region. In particular, Washington won’t like Riyadh’s desire to isolate Qatar and even, as a threat to MBS, transform it into an island by digging a 60km long and 200m wide canal in Saudi territory. In fact, it should be remembered that the USA has the important military base of Al Udeid in Qatar, near the capital Dohha.

Another conflict occurred at the beginning of the second decade of November between Gaza and Israel. An Israeli operation in the Strip with the achieved objective of killing a military leader of Hamas, has also caused the death of six other Palestinians and of an officer of the Israeli army. This was followed by missile launches in the Negev and the Israeli retaliation with air raids that hit 150 targets in the Strip. A truce, which has put an end to the umpteenth skirmish, will allow aid from Qatar to arrive in Gaza. This concession of the Netanyahu government has resulted in the resignation of the Minister of Defense, Avigdor Liberman. He would have liked a “stronger” military reaction, a sign of frictions within the Israeli ruling class on the manner and timing of the inevitable war for capitalist economic ends and social conservation in the region.