Taking up the title of the issue of Comunismo, 10/1982, we wanted to retrace, in issues 433 and 434 of our newspaper, the line expressed by the Party and its conduct in trade union activities since the Second World War.

The article we wish to republish today was published ten years later, in 1992. It clearly outlines and further clarifies what was expressed in the text at the time, reconfirming the continuity of the trade union tactics expressed then, which cannot be improvised or modified at every turn.

In the text we are republishing in this issue, “Terms of the Party’s Trade Union Activity,” some important points are defined:

First of all, the distinction between “reactionary unions” that operated at the time of the Second International and in the early post-war period, led in a counter-revolutionary direction by chauvinists and opportunists, but still potentially recoverable by a communist leadership; and on the other hand, once the workers’ unions of the time had been repressed and dissolved, the “regime unions”, created with the advent of fascism within the corporations, and then reconstituted after World War II, “tailored to Mussolini’s model,” as we described them at the time.

In order to gain credibility and consensus among the working class, the CGIL (named with the I meaning “Italian”) had to formally refer to the tradition of the old CGL, and the workers rallied around it, forcing it into tough struggles that flared up after World War II. The unavoidable reference to this tradition meant that communist militants were able to organize within it, waging bitter battles against the piecards, as we have already described, even considering the possibility of a “reconquest by force,” at least of its basic structures.

The article then describes how, starting in the 1970s, with the onset of the economic crisis, the CGIL, inaugurating its ‘policy of sacrifice’ in defense of the ‘national economy’, gradually revealed its characteristics as a ‘regime union’, opposing every episode of struggle expressed by the working class and closing every window of opportunity for communists to intervene within it.

The struggles, even on a national scale, that arose in some sectors of public employment (hospitals and schools) and transport (railways and air transport), conducted in contrast to the directives and actions of the union bosses, had expressed the need for autonomous organizations opposed to those of the official unions. Following the powerful 35-day strike at Fiat, which was betrayed and ultimately crushed by the CGIL, the Party decided to make its position clear: “out and against the regime’s union, for the rebirth of the class union.” The Party’s commitment in the trade union field, while retaining its willingness to intervene in any expression of the workers’ struggle, thus shifted its attention, given the situation that had arisen in Italy at the time, towards “rank and file unionism,” in which it recognized the tendency towards class reorganization against the collaborationist policy of the regime’s union.

Terms of the Party’s union activity

From Il Partito Comunista 202/1992

With regard to trade unions, the Party expresses positions that are principled in nature and concern the need for large economic organizations open to all wage earners.

Through its organized faction within them, the Party attempts to acquire decisive influence in them and, in the revolutionary phase, their very leadership. In this way, a link is created between the Party and the class (a transmission belt), through which it exercises its proper function of guiding the revolutionary movement.

The conquest of such influence over the intermediate proletarian organizations is achieved by demonstrating that its line is the most coherent and consistent in defending the conditions of the working class, as opposed to the line and leadership expressed by other political movements also organized within them (reformists, anarchists, syndicalists, etc.), against which a political struggle is waged. This should be clearly evident to all proletarians when put to the test.

We are dealing here with purely economic organizations, trade unions, whose irreplaceable function has always been emphasized by the Party, which is unaffected by the constant oscillations of others. Various intermediate bodies of a political nature, such as councils or soviets, will likely be necessary in the phase leading up to the conquest of power.

So much for the principles. Another question is the assessment of the current trade unions, our attitude towards them, and the tactics adopted by the Party in different circumstances.

In this regard, the Party’s action is linked to the interpretation of facts and the study of different situations, which is not immune to approximation and requires progressive clarifications and corrections.

First of all, we must consider the differences between countries in terms of the history of the formation of proletarian organizations, their organizational characteristics, their modus operandi, and the politics that inspired them in the face of the battles fought and defeats suffered by the proletariat. For example, Anglo-Saxon “unionist” trade unionism has very different characteristics from industrial trade unionism in Italy and France.

The Party’s assessments and tactics towards the current trade unions will therefore probably not be identical in all countries and circumstances.

The Party’s recommendation to no longer organize within the CGIL and to rebuild the class-based union “outside and against the regime’s union” is not a general principle of action for the Party, but rather the result of an assessment of the situation in Italy, which may still be refined or even revised as events unfold.

First of all, a distinction must be made.

Lenin rightly castigates the extremists who proceed to form “revolutionary” unions, abandoning the masses organized in the unions to the influence of counterrevolutionary social-democratic leaders, agents of the bourgeoisie. Communists must work even in the most reactionary unions, with the aim of taking over their leadership in favorable circumstances, ousting the old leaders, and overturning the policies that guide them.

But it is necessary to distinguish between “reactionary unions” and “regime unions.” The former are workers’ unions led by “chauvinists and opportunists, often directly or indirectly linked to the bourgeoisie and the police,” as Lenin says. Such leaders engage in actions that sabotage workers’ struggles and, above all, intervene to divert them from their class-based and revolutionary course. However, these unions retain their working-class character, are useful and used for the class struggle, and it is possible to organize communist workers within them and agitate for their slogans. Under favorable circumstances, they are susceptible to being won over to class action and the leadership of the Party.

Such was the nature of the CGL in Italy before fascism. Once this organization had been destroyed by fascist gangs and the state police, the bourgeoisie did not leave a vacuum: it set up the “fascist” union, the regime’s union, an emanation of the state. This was a compulsory union, whose structure emanated from above and was inaccessible to any class-based influence. Its inalienable principles were social collaboration, according to the principles of fascist corporatism, and therefore, by statute, communists were barred from joining. Although in some cases it showed itself to be in defense of workers’ demands, this organization was no longer a true union, and the Party instructed its members not to organize within it.

The CGIL (the added “I” stands for ‘Italian’), rebuilt after World War II, was declared by the Party to be the “heir to fascist trade unionism” and “tailored on Mussolini’s model.” In fact, it too was a direct emanation of the regime and established itself by stifling attempts at worker organization in the red sense of class.

However, there were needs linked to democratic propaganda and anti-fascist mystification that meant that this union formally took up the tradition of the former CGL, with which the majority of workers identified themselves. The Italian working masses considered the CGIL their combative red union. This allowed the Party to organize within it, agitating the principles of anti-capitalist class struggle, pointing out to workers the need for the union to “return” to class politics, and even attempting to conquer grassroots structures such as the Chambers of Labor, territorial bodies, or Shop Committees, factory bodies.

Even then, however, a second possibility was already on the horizon: the reconstruction of the class union from scratch. It was impossible at the time to predict which of the two possibilities would historically prevail.

In the period that followed, from the post-war period to the present day, the CGIL has gradually abandoned any formal reference not only to politics, but also, and above all, to the way in which the class-based trade union is organized and structured.

There was unification with the CISL and UIL, unions of separatist origin and emanating from employers, and the introduction of the delegation to employers for the collection of union dues, which the Party rejected, placing our militants outside the confederal union apparatus, as many of us were prevented from joining.

The economic crisis of the mid-1970s accelerated this process. Together with the launch of the “policy of sacrifice,” the CGIL’s organizational structure became increasingly tight and impervious to any class influence, to the extent that episodes of struggle in contrast with the collaborationist policy were increasingly forced to rely on the organization of workers outside the confederal union, which instead used all means to sabotage such struggles. The CGIL became increasingly closed and inaccessible, even at the grassroots and factory level. Today, the platforms of demands and agreements negotiated with employers are no longer even submitted to the approval of workers’ assemblies. All decisions are made in a sphere to which workers have no access.

The confederal union, which today has even ratified anti-strike laws, has become an organization separate from and opposed to the working class, a body of officials paid to push through any attack by capital and block any reaction by workers. Only a tiny minority of workers have access to its apparatus, those who, normally in order to gain personal advantages, sell themselves out by embracing that policy.

Under these conditions, it is impractical and illusory for the working class to expect communists to work within these organizations with the aim of ousting “corrupt and sell-out” leaders and winning them back to a class-based policy. For some time now, there have been no forums within the union where the Party can wage its battle. All access is barred to us, even if we had a membership card in our pocket and even if we gathered the support of many workers.

Of course, we participate with our positions in demonstrations, strikes, and the few workers’ assemblies that the union still calls, but this does not mean “working in the union.”

On the other hand, since the late 1970s, it has been clear that any attempt by workers to move away from the policy of collaboration has manifested itself through organizations outside and opposed to the confederal union. COBAS expresses this tendency. Meanwhile, internal opposition within the CGIL has proven to be nothing more than attempts to cover up, recover, and betray discontent.

Lenin speaks of “reactionary unions,” that is, organizations belonging to the working class even if led by corrupt and sell-out leaders. In these, it is possible, indeed essential, for communists to work to disavow the actions of the leadership and, in favorable situations, to win them back to class politics and the leadership of the Party. Today in Italy, however, we are faced with “regime” unions, which, although not yet declared “state” unions as under the fascist regime, are now intimately integrated into the institutional apparatus of capitalist power and no longer belong to the working class. They are closed and impenetrable structures, like any other institution of the regime, in which we find workers who are “registered” but not organized. They are tools that cannot be used by the class.

This leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to work from within to make them susceptible to class politics, and therefore to our formulation of the need to rebuild the class union from scratch, outside and against the regime union.

It is true that, despite widespread discontent, the majority of workers continue to follow the non-directives of these unions and do not yet express the need to abandon them in order to rebuild the class-based union. But the Party has the task of anticipating this need.

It is also to be expected that, faced with strong pressure from workers, these unions will find themselves in the position of not disavowing and formally placing themselves at the head of widespread struggles, when it is not possible to restrain them or isolate and repress the most combative elements. In such cases, the regime’s union could play its role by taking over the leadership of the movement and adopting some of its demands, but only in order to try to control it, limit it, divert it, and defeat it. The alternative of abandoning it to its own devices could lead to the most dire consequences for the regime. This happened, for example, in the case of the magnificent strike against layoffs, which was carried on relentlessly for a month by Fiat workers in 1980 and finally stabbed in the back by the CGIL.

The Party’s task in such situations would still be to point out the need for an organization independent of the regime’s union to lead the struggle.

We reiterate that these considerations relate to the situation in Italy, where the Party has had greater opportunities to engage in trade union activity to date, while we believe that the study of the situation in other countries, where we are also present but with limited forces, has not been sufficiently in-depth. This study is crucial for defining our positions on trade union tactics. It will have to retrace the history of trade union organizations to date, defining the forms and ways in which they are structured, how they are organized in factories and at higher levels, their links with political parties, the politics that inspire them, and their degree of integration into the state apparatus. It is necessary to understand the trends that are expressed within them and the actions of any opposition to the policies of the leadership groups, as well as the real possibility that grassroots organizations could become susceptible to class action.

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Another point we would like to clarify concerns the definition of what is meant by a “class union.” This is in response to those who would like to reduce the problem to a mere question of organizational forms. Many argue that it would be necessary to start again from “grassroots democracy” because the abandonment of democratic consultation with workers was the reason for the degeneration of the union. They also deplore the fact that a body of well-paid officials, removed from factory work, has replaced volunteer worker activists.

It is true that the regime’s union, which promotes anti-worker policies, is structured in such a way as not to be subordinate, but rather to systematically impose its will on the working class. But even in the class union, “grassroots democracy” will be a fetish and will have to be subordinated to the need for timely and unified action by the whole movement, as well as to the defense of the class line and action against the corporatist and reactionary pressures that will inevitably arise even at the grassroots level.

It is true that the regime’s union can only be based on an apparatus of well-paid and corrupt officials, but even the class union, while based on voluntary activity, will need full-time and therefore salaried leaders in a large and centralized organization.

Another point. It is not our task, nor anyone else’s, to discover new forms of organization, thinking that therein lies the key to solving the problem of rebuilding the class union. It is possible that, in a phase of recovery, the class will express forms of organization different from the traditional ones, which we cannot predict today. It is not, therefore, the COBAS that are the object of our interest because they manifest original forms of workers’ organization, but because they express the tendency towards reorganization against collaborationist politics.

What we anticipate is the need for a return to class politics and action on the part of purely economic organizations of wage earners alone, structured in a centralized manner to ensure the unity of action of the movement, based on factory organizations, but also necessarily external, of a territorial nature.

We will return to these last points in a future article.