The temporary withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East

In the Middle East as a whole, many explanations of the current arrangements come from the partial and probably temporary withdrawal of the United States from the region, which has already had significant effects.

The US-Iranian co-management of Iraq

In Iraq, US forces concentrated in two main bases after a reduction in personnel.

In the drone attack that at the beginning of January had resulted in the death of the Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Qods militia of the Pasdaran, the US was not aiming for war with Iran and we were not mistaken in this reading and forecasting of the facts, while much of the information spoke of inevitable war. In reality there was only one Iranian demonstrative missile attack, agreed with the enemy, against two US bases in Iraq.

The elimination of Soleimani was a warning: Iran does not delude itself that it is taking too much advantage of the partial US withdrawal, since its military power, integral and well-oiled, can strike you at any time, from any side and on any target. Dissuasion of Iran’s regional aims was achieved with a minimum expenditure of energy. But we also think of the internal balance of the Tehran regime.

On the other hand, the Iranian regime continues to use the elimination of Soleimani for internal propaganda purposes: to arouse the perception of encirclement and compact the home front, the Iranian media denounce plots hatched by the United States. Two Iranians were executed in July on charges of spying for the CIA and the Mossad.

This non-contingent trend in Washington policy certainly responds not to the spectacular traits of the “head” of the White House but to the need to deal with the sharing of oil revenues.

Moreover, behind the semblance of the all-out confrontation between Iran and the United States, there is no shortage of under-the-table exchanges. This explains the brutal joint co-management of Iraq starting in the years immediately following the second Gulf War. The appointment of the new Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi on 7 May is a success for US policy in the area. An old opponent of Saddam Hussein’s regime, he was raised by the Atlantic establishment. Since 2016, he has been the head of the Iraqi secret services. Since taking office al-Kadhimi has taken steps to forge better relations with Saudi Arabia, and Iraqi Finance Minister Ali Allawi has already reached an agreement to supply electricity from his powerful neighbor.

At the same time, the US offered Iran something in return: economic sanctions were eased, with the official reason for the Covid-19 emergency, and a Luxembourg court released the frozen Iranian accounts following the sanctions imposed since 2018.

But any Iraqi government policy cannot free the country from Iranian influence. There are great economic interests at stake and a considerable trade exchange: in the first quarter of 2020 Iraq imported from the neighboring country for a value of 1.45 billion dollars. In addition, in the current hot summer, Iraq is suffering from a shortage of electricity due to the drop in production per thousand megawatts compared to last year due to poor maintenance of some power plants. Here then is that the Iraqi premier flew to Tehran at the end of July where he signed two important contracts in the energy field: Iran will deal with the repair of the electricity distribution network of the holy Shiite cities of Najaf and Karbala and a large supply of transformers.

Meanwhile, discontent continues to spread among the proletariat and the semi-proletarian strata of Iraqi society. The protests, after a partial pause due to Covid-19, have recaptured the urban center of the main cities. On Sunday 26 July in Baghdad the security forces returned to shoot and kill the demonstrators, two or three depending on the sources. And to say that a short time before, al-Kadhami, in order to divert responsibility for the massacres from the government security forces (the deaths are about 600 since October 1, 2019, when the street protests began) had stated that they had been the work of the Iranian militias and for this he had threatened to attack the headquarters of the pro-Iranian Shiite militias Kataib Hezbollah. Evidently it was a cynical diversion for the square, without even bothering Iran too much. On the other hand, both the Iraqi security apparatus and the pro-Iranian militias were responsible for the massacres and the mutual accusations of shedding the blood of the Iraqi proletarians is not considered a cause of ignominy by any of the delinquent bourgeois factions involved.

Partial folding

    The persistent dispute between the United States and the other major oil countries, namely Russia and Saudi Arabia, has for now imposed a policy aimed at evading excessive collisions susceptible to military outlets. Of course, this did not exclude proxy wars with the direct and indirect involvement in them of the crude oil-producing powers for the sharing of the rent. But if every war, wherever it takes place, redefines to some extent or reaffirms the hierarchy among states, the last decade has marked the weakening of the influence of the United States in the Middle East, while that of the Russia. The emergence of the persistent elements of ambiguity that characterize the link between Turkey and NATO contributed to the creation of new balances.

The so-called oil price war between Russia and Saudi Arabia that characterized the first months of this year now seems a long way off also thanks to the collapse in demand due to Covid-19. All the major producers have given up part of their production. That of Saudi Arabia is 7.5 million barrels per day, 4.8 less than last year’s production and at the lowest of the last 20 years. So Riyadh, in order to cope with the drop in revenues, has decided to increase VAT from 5 to 15%. A fact that could have serious internal repercussions.

The reasons for the partial withdrawal of the United States from the Middle Eastern scenario are also linked to the progress of the economic cycle, with the chronicization of the effects of the 2008 crisis. The manufacturing production of the United States is still significantly below the maximum peak reached in 2007. Since then, US capital has sought compensation for stagnation in domestic oil production, from the exploitation of oil and gas from oil shale, which has contributed to an increase in production of four million barrels per day over the past four years. But, when domestic production was developing, the United States, in a context of substantial stagnation of world demand, had to try to limit the production of countries that have been sidelined by wars, as in the case of Iraq and Libya, or Iran, which is experiencing a new phase of international isolation, mitigated in part by political economic relations with Russia and China. But even this was not enough to keep the US economy afloat.

Meanwhile, Tehran, following Trump’s unilateral breakdown of the nuclear pact and the attitude of acquiescent submission of the European Union countries to the sanctions imposed by the United States, appears increasingly inclined to develop relations with China, which has already a few years ago it was Iran’s first trading partner with an exchange volume of around $ 52 billion. A strategic partnership agreement is now in the offing for the next 25 years. The document circulated last month and, albeit without an official sanction, provides a significant picture of the progress of bilateral relations between China and Iran. The sectors most affected by the cooperation will be on the one hand the energy and petrochemicals, with China which would become the main buyer of Iranian oil, and on the other the infrastructures that will see Iran take part in Chinese projects in the context of the Road of Silk.

The agreement also provides for military collaboration, although at least for now there is no mention of Chinese bases along the Iranian coasts of the Persian Gulf and Oman. Probably Beijing does not want to disturb economic relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, sworn enemies of Iran but excellent trading partners of China, which buys oil from them.
China’s influence on the Middle East, the world’s largest oil importer, will only continue to grow. At the same time, Iran is also looking to Moscow, so much so that some partisans of European Atlanticism, worried by the decline of US influence in the region, are convinced of the birth of an integrated military alliance between Iran, China and Russia, aimed at redesign the political structures of the Middle East. For now this possibility does not seem so close, more a need for propaganda. Like China, Russia also intends to maintain good relations with the petromonarchies of the Gulf, archrival of Tehran.

The diplomatic and political match in the Middle East for now is being fought more on the maintenance of precarious equilibrium than on the preparation of an open armed confrontation between rival imperialist fronts.