Considerations on Party Tactics for Union Work

The workers’ economic struggle is an essential aspect of the Communist Party’s work. It is decisive work for two closely related reasons. 1) It is, as Lenin rightly put it, the proletariat’s „school of war” since it enables the penetration of the Party among the proletarian masses as a result of its constant contact with them. This is by virtue of the Party’s ability to point out the most consistent demands and the most effective methods for achieving the class’s own interests. 2) The relentless economic struggle of the proletariat is a stumbling block for capital as it tries to solve its crises by intensifying the rate of exploitation, reducing direct and indirect wages, and increasing the organic composition of capital (increasing constant capital to the detriment of variable capital, i.e., labor) with the consequent expulsion of labor power from the production cycle.

Besides, since the time of the Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848), we have known that „now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever expanding union of the workers. This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry, and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralise the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes.”

Thus the central, fundamental result for the party is to foster the connection between the various sectors of the working class, and the proletarians’ perception of their existence as a mass with the same interests and goals – hence as a class, opposed to that of the exploiters. The material result of the individual struggle, even if positive, is always temporary, and it is defenseless against subsequent and inevitable attacks of the bosses and their state.

What, then, are the union activities? Where are these actually possible? What should the Party do with regards to the workers’ economic struggles?

The expression “trade union work” should not be understood as being limited to work that takes place exclusively within trade unions (with the usual liturgy of the democratic election of delegates and the winning of leadership positions within the various trade union organizations). It must refer to all economic struggles of the working class, wherever and however these take place. Party members are part of unions whether or not they can influence that particular union in the short term, or get democratically elected to leadership positions. The aim is to be involved in the economic struggles of the working class on every possible occasion, and according to the forces of the party. This will continue even if, on some occasions, they are represented by non-proletarians. This is to maintain and strengthen contact with the class, so that it will always have the party’s indication as to the best way to conduct the struggle, which we know is the most adequate to achieve the objectives. At the same time, in the appropriate situations, we present to the proletarians the only final solution to their exploitation: the revolutionary one.

The party must always have a clear idea of its task, and what means it can use, depending on the actual situation it faces, in time and space. And this is because our doctrinal positions are never fully set out; they must be continually developed by successive generations of communists, even regarding the clarification of the limits of tactics within which one can operate. Even for general doctrinal issues, the sculpting (a continuous and progressive clarification of the party’s unavoidable path) is always a fundamental work of the party, in light of acquired historical experience. This is all the more true in the field of practical activities, and notably that of the trade union: “The tactical limits are not drawn by theory, but by reality.”

In order to define our tactics for the current putrid situation, and especially for the future resumption of struggles, we must reaffirm the cornerstones of party action, as is tradition, by returning to the basic principles and experiences of our past: Marxism, the Comintern, the PCd’I, which first posed the question of the “united trade union front,” and the Profintern of the 1920s. Of course, the experience in different countries varied due to reactionary capitalist forces and their agents in the proletarian organs, as well as the different trade union structures at that time. But the directions issued by the important international organizations and our party have general value.

In those years the rank-and-file organizations of the working class had, even in normal times, what today would be called a gigantic “revolutionary charge,” and this was not, as it will never be, even in phases of high social tension, the product of the acquisition of a “consciousness” of the ultimate aims and objectives of proletarian movement. This is rather the product of pressing material necessities. This is as true for the class as it is for the individual; the formula is not “consciousness first and action later,” but “economic drive, then action, and finally consciousness.” This consciousness is not realized in the individual, but in the party, which has the task of reversing the course, using that consciousness to lead the class, both in the field of economic struggles and in that of armed political struggle.

After World War I, we witnessed the historical phenomenon whereby the state shifted from tolerating workers’ organizations to conquering them. A phenomenon that was particularly visible in Italy with fascism, but which actually occurred in all capitalist countries in different times in different ways.

The fascist unions appeared as one of many union labels, bearing the tricolor in opposition to the red, yellow and white ones—but the capitalist world was now a world of monopoly, and that fate was inevitable in the presence of a retreating labor movement. Thus the state, the collective manager of capital’s interests, was in charge of controlling workers’ organizations. Not by absorbing them into its structure, let’s be clear, but by ensuring that, even while controlling the unions, they appeared as independent bodies. The Corporations were a structure of the Fascist state, but the bourgeoisie soon understood that formally incorporating the trade unions would nullify their effectiveness, since it would become clear that they were not organizations capable of defending the interests of proletarians. That is why after World War II we wrote that the new trade unions born out of the Resistance were tailored “on the Mussolini model.” We also wrote that “this great new fact of the contemporary era was not reversible.”

However, the unions continue to have the characteristic of being composed only of wage earners. Therefore the participation of revolutionaries, even if at certain junctures they are expelled or conditions arise that make it impossible to work within them, is an unavoidable necessity – we never voluntarily give up working within them.

Monopoly capitalism can no longer tolerate the independence of trade unions. It demands that reformist opportunism and the working-class aristocracy, who pick up the crumbs from its lavish table, become its political police vis à vis the proletariat. If this goal is not achieved the opportunist leadership can be removed and replaced by the fascist method. It goes without saying that all the efforts of trade union opportunism in the service of imperialism cannot, in the long run, save it from its inevitable end.

Today’s trade union situation therefore diverges from that of 1921, not only because of the lack of a strong Communist party, but also because of the gradual elimination of the content of trade union action. They’ve replaced rank-and-file action with bureaucratic functionality: assemblies, elections, party factions in trade unions, professional officials in place of elected leaders, etc. However, we repeat that we are convinced that in a moment of crisis and intense economic struggle, the trade unions will pass into the hands of those who are genuinely dedicated to class interests. Finally, it will fall under the leadership of the Communist Party.

Thus the party guides its actions based on the specific principles that we established in 1962:

• No economic conquest is lasting, and does not serve the general interests of the class unless it results in growing solidarity among the exploited.
• The abandonment of the general strike without time limits and without distinction of factory, sector, and category, not only fails to secure immediate economic gains, but also erodes and destroys the future and general possibilities of the proletarian attack on the regime of capitalist exploitation. Consequently, the party favors the most widespread possible strikes, in every situation, time, and place, ultimately aiming for a general strike.
• The “tactics” of articulated bargaining, of claiming additional qualifications per category, productivity bonuses and company incentives, of striking in a fragmented way and for very short periods, increases rather than reduces the competition among workers, and worsens their isolation from each other.
• The theory of the “apolitical nature of the union” actually conceals the union’s abandonment of class politics in favor of a policy that supports the central bourgeois power.
• There are no “particular” issues that can be resolved outside the general vision of the historical interests of the working class.

Given the party’s meager strength, and until it is much greater—it is unknown whether this will be before or after the resurgence of broad-based economic class organizations—the party cannot, nor should it, proclaim a boycott of company unions and workers’ agitations. Nor can it proclaim its presence everywhere and always in factory union elections, with its own lists. Nor can it, even where it is powerful, openly agitate for a “boycott” calling on the workers to not vote, not to join the union, not to strike, etc.

In 1974, the reconstituted Party in Italy recognized that a substantial part of the most combative workers had left the CGIL. The Party rightly oriented much of its activity toward workers’ militants organized in rank-and-file committees (CUB) and resolutely defended this expression of class struggle.

In the following years, several acronyms of rank-and-file unions emerged, which were also called “conflict unions.”

In view of this growing phenomenon, the Party adopted, in Italy, the slogan working “outside and against the regime unions.” This was a necessary tactical remedy to the regime unions’ collaborationist maneuvers, in conjunction with the so-called “EUR Turn.”

This slogan was a defense against the subordination of trade union bodies to the demands of capitalist restructuring which tightened, like a noose, around the proletariat’s interests and needs even more visibly than before. The formal acknowledgement of the abandonment of class struggle was merely the result of a practice de facto established after the end of a period of economic prosperity. This was a phase in which the workers had been more inclined to struggle, and the regime unions couldn’t help but pander in part to workers’ initiatives of struggle and demands; otherwise, they would have lost control over a very disobedient working class. This choice by the Party was also influenced by the fact that it had now become almost impossible for dissenting voices to express themselves within the normal activity of the CGIL, and thus made it impossible to maintain the relationship with the class—except during street demonstrations.

At the present stage it will be appropriate to take stock of this approach and watchword, which should not be understood as a fundamental and principled feature of the party, but rather as a tactical line in union work. This is, by its nature, not immutable.

This “evaluation,” based on the experience of the past decades, will have to examine the current and future role of trade unions, whether regime or rank-and-file, not only in Italy, but internationally on the general terrain of class struggle.

At least until there is a generalized resurgence of the class struggle, pointing to a union direction rigidly defined and supposedly valid for every country risks making the party’s union work ineffective, if not extremely tenuous. Even if in Italy the attempt to take the workers’ struggle outside and against the regime unions must remain among our objectives, this should not result in a rigid approach that paralyzes the work of comrades within the CGIL. Doing so, especially in situations where the overwhelming majority of workers still recognize themselves in the regime unions, could isolate us from the mass of the proletariat. What’s more, in the case of Italy, it is still necessary to assess the difficulty of working even in some of the self-styled rank-and-file unions, which often reproduce the defects of the official ones: power struggles, failure to unite organs of struggle in order to defend personal privileges, political careerism, and so on, all without significantly improving the quality and intensity of struggles. In fact, several decades of counterrevolution have helped to distort their character as spontaneous organizations formed by fighting workers to defend their immediate and class interests. Moreover, these unions are not entirely immune to the allure of homegrown chauvinism—think of the frequent calls for nationalizations to save failing industries. Nor do they shy away from trysts with bourgeois state alignments, such as the BRICS, or with regimes that, at least in talk, claim to stand against the hegemonic imperialist bloc.

In general terms, on the other hand, considering the global landscape of the class struggle, the party’s attitude toward economic struggle could be summarized by the formula that workers’ struggles must take place “outside the control of the official unions” (i.e., regime, state-registered and pro-boss). If such struggles escape the domination of the trade union apparatus serving capital, the working class will set out on the path of its own class independence, which will only be truly realized when the Communist Party takes over the leadership of the proletariat.

We do not limit our agitation to organized opposition within this or that sector or trade union, but aim at the unification of workers beyond the sectional and individual control of trade unions. We must always keep in mind the distinction between tactical issues and the general strategic goals of the Party for the class as a whole.

This or that tactical claim may or may not lead to positive responses from workers and their minority organizations, and the absence of immediate success is not in itself a reason to abandon such claims. Agitation can always be reviewed and refined once the struggle has reached a certain degree of maturity. However, tactics should not be elevated to the level of strategy, because when an organization’s overall strategy fails, the organization faces serious objective problems in reorienting itself. Our party, which is a jealous party, and is fiercely protective of its own political isolation, claims our own “sectarianism.” We shun any alliance and coalition with other parties, and we likewise disdain every inclination towards “union sectarianism.” We do both by virtue of a consistent and dialectical vision.

The road to the united class front must go through a long and complex process, culminating in the exclusive political leadership of the Communist Party over the proletariat. To walk this path, we must treat with great skepticism, and frankly revulsion, any notion that our organization should become the promoter of new unions, or of small, scattered trade union agglomerations. Though they are few in numbers, the latter remain infested with shady leftist grouplets—our insidious and unrelenting enemies.

The experiences of class struggle in different countries, both victorious and defeated, are of vital importance and will have different weight and importance in different countries. Moreover, demands—except those that we deem universally valid in all times and circumstances, like wage increases, decrease of working hours, wages for the unemployed—can be articulated differently from one moment to the next, and across different countries and continents.

We recall here, by way of conclusion, two points contained in the Characteristic Theses of the Party (1951):

“The Party will never set up economic associations which exclude those workers who do not accept its principles and leadership. But the Party recognises without any reserve that not only the situation which precedes insurrectional struggle but also all phases of substantial growth of Party influence amongst the masses cannot arise without the expansion between the Party and the working class of a series of organisations with short term economic objectives with a large number of participants. Within such organisations the party will set a network of communist cells and groups, as well as a communist fraction in the union.
“In periods when the working class is passive, the Party must anticipate the forms and promote the constitution of organisations with immediate economic aims. These may be unions grouped according to trade, industry, factory committees or any other known grouping or even quite new organisations. The Party always encourages organisations which favour contact between workers at different localities and different trades and their common action. It rejects all forms of closed organisations.
“[…]
“The Party does not hide the fact that when things start moving again this will not only be felt by its own autonomous development, but by the starting up again of mass organisations. Although it could never be free of all enemy influence and has often acted as the vehicle of deep deviations; although it is not specifically a revolutionary instrument, the union cannot remain indifferent to the party who never gives up willingly to work there, which distinguishes it clearly from all other political groups who claim to be of the ‘opposition’. The Party acknowledges that today, its work in the unions can be done but sporadically; it does not renounce however to enter into the economic organisations, and even to gain leadership as soon as the numerical relationship between its members and sympathisers on the one hand, the union members or a given branch on the other is suitable, so long as the union in question does not exclude all possibility of autonomous class action.”

And in 1962 we added:

“Let us therefore take care to carry out serenely, methodically, continuously our work of penetration and proselytizing among the proletarian masses, without allowing ourselves to be seized either by discouragement over failures that we must foresee and discount in advance, or by the hysterics of ‘doing for the sake of doing,’ and above all without indulging in the illusion that the time of revolutionary recovery can be accelerated by tactical recipes or organizational expedients that isolate the conventionally called trade union work from the general and political work of the movement”.

This is why the International Communist Party is still walking on the same road as always for workers’ economic struggle, by relaunching the integral formula of the united class trade union front of the whole proletariat.