The historical roots of the conflict

The conflict between India and Pakistan has its roots in the imperialist partition of the subcontinent, formalised in 1947 under the retreating British imperialists. Colonial India, unified under British rule, was carved up according to sectarian criteria imposed from above, creating bourgeois states on religious grounds: a Hindu-majority India and a Muslim-majority Pakistan. Within the framework of this partition, the principalities recognised by the British Empire were given the ‘freedom’ to choose which state to join. In the case of Kashmir – with a Muslim majority but a Hindu ruler – the decision was forced: India sent troops, enforcing annexation by military force. Pakistan responded with war. Since then, the region has been the epicenter of armed conflict and repression, with the civilian population caught between two competing national bourgeoisies. The so-called Line of Control (LoC), which emerged from the 1947–48 war, remains a de facto military border, unrecognised by either side.

To note, bourgeois nationalism was not confined to a single territory. In 1965, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar, attempting to incite a Muslim uprising in Kashmir. In 1971, with the Bangladesh War, a new front opened up: India supported the secession of East Pakistan, contributing to Pakistan’s defeat and the birth of a new state in the region.

The Durand Line, Drawn in 1893 between India and Afghanistan by British imperialism, represents a border drawn not on ethnic or historical grounds, but by that of the force of the British military might, splitting the Pashtun people into two entities. The Pashtun city of Peshawar was incorporated into the colonial territory, whilst Afghanistan lost a traditional demographic base. Today, Pakistan’s Pashtun population exceeds that of Afghanistan, giving rise to a movement for territorial recovery that lays claim to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan (or Beluchistan); no Afghan government, whether they were monarchical, republican, or Taliban, has ever accepted the Durand Line as a definitive border.

Pashtuns, Balochis (Beluchis) and regional complexities

Thusly, the current balance of power between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran rests on a precarious equilibrium, a legacy of artificial colonial borders and bourgeois states incapable of organically unifying their populations. The region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, formerly the North-west Frontier province, is a hotbed of constant conflict. With a population of around 35 million, predominantly Pashtun, and a poverty rate of 39%, it acts as a strategic buffer between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The socio-economic indicators are alarming; female literacy stands at 27% and access to drinking water is available to less than half the population.

The Taliban themselves, having returned to power following the collapse of the US occupation, represent a form of Pashtun nationalism cloaked in religion. Whilst avoiding explicit statements on ethnic unification they maintain a structural link with the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, TTP), aimed at destabilizing the Pakistani authority in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Since 2008, the latter have been classified as ‘terrorists’ by the Islamabad, but the crackdown has not stopped the attacks.

India has historically exploited these tensions to weaken Pakistan, its strategic rival. Since 2002, Delhi has invested over three billion dollars in Afghanistan; the Salma Dam in Herat, the parliament building in Kabul, and numerous roads linking Afghanistan directly to Iran, bypassing Pakistan. Islamabad interpreted these moves as an attempt at ‘strategic encirclement’. Delhi has also maintained ties with Baloch separatist groups, offering diplomatic and financial support and, according to Pakistani sources, military support as well.

China has added a further layer of complexity with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), part of the Belt and Road Initiative, with planned investments of sixty two billion dollars. The port of Gwadar in Balochistan, managed by China Overseas Port Holding Company, has become the hub of the project. For China, Pakistan’s stability is now a priority; for India, CPEC represents a threat to its regional sovereignty.

Added to this picture is the issue of the Baloch. Like the Pashtuns, they are a divided people; the majority live in Pakistan, a minority in Iran, and a small number in Afghanistan. Pakistani Balochistan, the country’s largest and poorest region, is rife with contradictions: it possesses vast mineral resources, yet 63% of the population lives below the poverty line.

The Main Baloch groups include the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), and Jaish al-Adl on the Iranian side. In Pakistan, Baloch militants systematically attack Chinese infrastructure and projects: since 2018, they have targeted the Chinese consulate in Karachi, the stock exchange and convoys of the Chinese engineers, forcing Beijing to review the CPEC timetable.

The Nuclear Threat and the Balance of Mutual Destruction

Indian and Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons has fundamentally altered the nature of the crises in the region, introducing a deterrent that mitigates the risk of war without eliminating it. The nuclear tests of 1998 formalised this reality and, since then, every military crisis has unfolded under the shadow of potential nuclear holocaust. In this, India has adopted a ‘No First Use’ policy, committing itself to using nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear attack. Pakistan, by contrast, rejects such a commitment in order to compensate for its conventional military inferiority, leaving open the possibility of a preemptive strike on the battlefield.

Pakistan’s nuclear programme, having been developed with China’s material support, is based on a comprehensive deterrence doctrine that involves the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, designed as weapons of war for use in limited operations. This approach aims to counter India’s Cold Start Strategy, which relies on rapid military intervention before international diplomacy can intervene. This illusion that deterrence is a factor of stability is a distortion of imperialist propaganda. In reality, armed capitalism knows no stability, but only an unstable equilibrium founded on the threat of total destruction.

The Evolution of Terrorist Networks

Recent military operations against Jihadist infrastructure in Pakistan have highlighted that the Islamic terrorist network is an integral part of the Pakistani state’s economy and repressive apparatus. Organisations such as Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) operate in a manner similar to organised crime groups, blending legal and illegal activities. Command lies in the hands of the Azhar family. Masood Azhar, released in 1999 following the hijacking of an Indian civilian aircraft, founded JeM in 2000, establishing links with the Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda and sections of the Pakistani intelligence Service (ISI). JeM does not operate entirely in secret. It owns Madrasas training centers, properties, front companies, media outlets, and a claimed humanitarian network through Al Rahmat Trust, which was formally banned but remains active. The Markaz Subhan Allah complex in Bahawalpur is an example of their outwards operations: formally a religious school, the Markaz Subhan Allah complex is in reality a JeM operational center, which doubled in size after 2022, when Pakistan was removed from the Financial Action Task Force’s grey list. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), founded in 1990 with the support of Osama bin Laden, follows a similar pattern. Through its charitable front organisation, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, it runs a network of schools, clinics, and welfare centers, thereby strengthening its social roots and ensuring a steady flow of recruits.

Counter-Insurgency in India: the Privatization of Repression

Whilst analyses tend to focus on armed groups backed by Pakistan, India has developed its own para-state apparatus of repression, which is particularly evident the fight against Maoist movements in rural and tribal areas. The red corridor – a strip of territory stretching across Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar, and Andhra Pradesh – has become a testing ground for a sophisticated and brutal privatization of state violence carried out by private militias.

Since 2005, as part of Operation Green Hunt, the Indian state has not only mobilised regular forces such as the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), but also has created and funded civilian militias such as the Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh. Recruited from within the tribal communities themselves, often under duress or in exchange for economic privileges, these groups have carried out a scorched earth policy in villages suspected of supporting the guerrillas.

Salwa Judum, declared illegal by the Supreme Court in 2011, has been replaced by new formations as the District Reserve Group (DRG) and Battalion 241. According to reports from human rights organisations, over five hundred villages have been forcibly evacuated and at least fifty thousand Adivast – a tribal people in the area – have been displaced. In Chhattisgarh alone, more than six hundred extrajudicial killings were documented between 2018 and 2023. The operation aims to clear areas rich in natural resources for multinational mining companies, to the displeasure and resultant resistance of the local peasant movements.

In recent months, there has been an intensification of the armed conflict, which has now been ongoing for sixty years. This escalation has taken the form of a large scale military operations, resulting in the killing of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India – Maoist party-, Nambala Keshav Rao, over four hundred rebels, as well as the capture of more than seven hundred others.

The Internationalization of Jihadism

Against the backdrop of state disintegration and imperialist realignment in Asia, the recent convergence between Jihadist groups on the Indian subcontinent and global terrorist organisations points to the emergence of a transnational armed network.

In April 2025, a few days before the attack on Pahalgam, a Hamas delegation was hosted at the Markas Subhan Allah complex in Bahawalpur, the operational headquarters of Jaish-e-Mohammed. The meeting was attended by members of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the head of the Pakistani-administered Kashmir government. Two months earlier, in Rawalkot, a Conference on Solidarity with Kashmir and Operation Al-Aqsa had been attended by representatives of Hamas, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hizabul Mujahideen, and JeM.

The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan has given new impetus to cross-border Jihadism. At least three training camps in the provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar are run jointly by the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Jihadist groups, welcoming recruits of various nationalities into a sort of Islamist reactionary international.

BRICS and the Myth of the ‘Multi-polar’ Alternative

The conflict between India and Pakistan exposes the internal contradictions within the BRICS+ bloc, demonstrating the limitations of its claim to represent a ‘multi-polar’ alternative to the western imperialist order. BRICS is not an anti-imperialist front, but an inter-state cartel of imperialist powers with divergent interests.

India, a founding member of BRICS, is in a state of open conflict with Pakistan, a strategic ally of China, another pillar of the bloc. This rift paralyses any prospect of military cooperation within BRICS. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) runs through territories disputed between India and Pakistan, and any escalation puts Chinese investments at risk.

Iran has attempted to position itself as a mediator, but its position is undermined by China’s loyalties to Pakistan. Russia, which is closer to India, maintains an ambiguous stance, calling for ‘restrain’ and denouncing external forces. BRICS claims to represent forty percent of the world’s population, but these figures mask the act that demographic strength does not translate into strategic cohesion.

The Attack in Pahalgam and the Escalation

On 22 April 2025, in the tourist resort of Pahalgam in India-administered Kashmir, an armed group killed twenty-six people. 25 were Indian tourist and one Nepalese national. This action was an operation designed to maximise political and psychological impact. The attackers demanded that the victims recite the shahada or prove they were circumcised, killing those who refused. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Resistance Front (TRF), a group that emerged in 2019 following the repeal of Article 370, which had granted Kashmir autonomy.

According to Indian and America sources, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is behind the TRF, supported by the Pakistani military through the ISI. The attack displayed a remarkable level of sophistication: NATO-standard weapons, synchronized movements and encrypted communications, all indicative of advanced military training. The aim was also economic; to target tourism, the driving force behind the normalisation of capitalism in Kashmir, given that in 2024, over 1.8 million tourist had visited the region.

Following the attack, Prime Minister Narendre Modi gave the army carte blanche, expelled Pakistani diplomats, closed the Attari border crossing and unilaterally suspended the Indus Waters Treaty. Pakistan responded with reciprocal measures, convening the National Command Authority which oversees the nuclear arsenal.

Operation Sindoor and the Air Battle

On 7 May 2025, India launched “Operation Sidoor”, a series of air and missile strikes against nine sites on Pakistani territory identified as ‘terrorist infrastructure’. The name, taken from the red powder worn by married Hindu women, aims to sanctify the war by linking it to religion and ‘national honour’.

The targets icluded the Sawai Nala and Syedna Belal camps (Muzaffarabad), Gulpur, and Abbas (Kotli), Barnala (Bhimber), and the strategic centers Markaz Taiba (Muridke) and Markaz Subhan (Bahawalpur). According to official sources, the operation resulted in around seventy deaths among the ‘terrorists’ and lasted less than half an hour.

Pakistan responded with Operation Bunyan Al Marsoos – “Impenetrable Wall” – claiming to have shot down five Indian fighter jets. This led to the largest air battle in South Asia since the 1971 war, involving some fifty to sixty aircraft.

The Pakistani Air Force deployed J-10C and F-16 aircraft armed with PL-15E missiles, capable of striking targets at a range of 145km. Debris from an Indian Dassault Rafale was found near Bathinda; this marks the first time a Rafale has been lost in combat.

The clash highlighted the dominance of Beyond Visual Range (BVR) combat and the widespread use of electronic warfare, creating what a Pakistani source described as “an electromagnetic fog of war”.

Ceasefire and Disinformation

On 10 May 2025, a ceasefire was announced following US mediation. Donald Trump claimed credit for the achievement, whist Secretary of State Rubio confirmed Washington’s direct involvement, citing “credible intelligence” regarding an imminent escalation.

The conflict has triggered an unprecedented disinformation war. Footage taken from video games such as Arma 3 have been circulated as evidence of attacks. Pakistan has reused images from military exercises; India has used videos of bombings in Syria, passing them off as operations in Pakistan. On social media, millions of users have shared manipulated content, making it impossible to distinguish fact from fiction.

Current Outlook

The ceasefire has brought the acute phase of conflict to an end, but the underlying tensions remain unresolved. Kashmir, strategic corridors, ethnic and religious tensions, and regional instability continue to fuel the potential for conflict. The region remains a complex arena, where Jihadist militias, separatist movements and arms trafficking intertwine with competing states.

BRICS, unable to halt the conflict between two of its leading members and paralysed by internal contradictions, has failed to offer a concrete alternative. US intervention has provided a respite that has allowed forces to regroup. The working class, in India as in Pakistan, has no interest in these wars between national bourgeoisie. The enemy is not the people across the border, but the domestic ruling class. The international class struggle remains the only alternative to the spiral of war and domination.