Libya, oil, Eni, and migrants

Developments in the war in Ukraine and the recent conflict with Iran have diverted attention away from all other active conflicts of varying nature and intensity, estimated at 56 worldwide, according to some specialized  research centers. Nevertheless, the vampiric system of capitalist production continues to organize itself adequately enough to continue plundering natural resources and raw materials in those desolate countries, better yet, in the silence that favors these infamous trafficking operations.

One such situation is unfolding on Italy’s so-called “fourth shore”: Libya, with its oil discovered by chance in 1939, and the maneuvers of Eni, the National Hydrocarbons Board. This Italian multinational has been active in the oil, gas, and various other energy sectors since 1959 and continues to play a leading role among the various oil companies holding exploration and extraction licenses.

We refer readers to an article we published in issue No. 415/2022 of this paper, titled “The precarious stalemate in Libya”, in which we provided a detailed account of events from the fall of Gaddafi’s regime in 2011 through his violent death and up to the cessation of hostilities in 2020 among the various armed groups that continue to vie for control of the country. A truce was necessary to hold new presidential elections and form a new central government for all of Libya; these elections have not yet been called due to the numerous objections raised by the various factions.

In fact, all parties vying for Libyan oil have had to accept the current, seemingly stabilized situation, under which they are forced to negotiate with the authorities in Tripoli, specifically, the Government of National Unity (Gnu) presided by Mohammed Dbeibah, and those in Benghazi, headed by General Khalifa Haftar, as their primary interlocutors, in addition to various small armed groups in Fezzan.

Despite frequent and recurring political tensions, the long-term agreement that guarantees Eni’s extraction activities through 2042 for oil and through 2047 for gas remains in effect. This is guaranteed by the Libyan authorities and the NOC (National Oil Corporation), Libya’s national oil company, which manages all activities related to the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources.

Respecting this agreement is very important for Italy’s energy-intensive capitalist system because, in the Libyan context, two major powers, Russia and Turkey, have recently been asserting their claim to operate the facilities, a role of primary importance in both the extractive and political sectors, to the detriment of the other countries involved, including, of course, Italy.

Against this backdrop, the four official trips that Italian Prime Minister Meloni has made since 2023, focusing on cooperation, migrants, gas, and oil, are quite understandable. It is also worth noting the six trips made by Interior Minister Piantedosi between Tripoli and Benghazi, primarily concerning security and migration flows, as well as the controversial and never clearly explained case of the repatriation via a government flight of Libyan General Almasri, who was arrested in Turin in 2025.

The circulation of goods and capital is vital to the existence of capitalism; a halt or even a mere slowdown in this circulation can trigger or exacerbate an economic crisis that is already underway. Libya’s precarious status quo currently ensures the regular flow of hydrocarbons and, at the same time, the flow of money derived from that source; there is no longer the financial uncertainty caused by the existence of two separate central banks resulting from the division of power between Tripoli and Benghazi. In fact, in August 2023, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) officially announced the reunification of the two sides, with the primary aim of stabilizing the economy and managing oil revenues in a unified manner. This process was supported and guaranteed by the UN, but strong tensions persist between the two former factions, making full technical and administrative integration still very complex due to ongoing political fragmentation.

In this scenario, it is widely accepted that General Haftar’s Cyrenaica is increasing its political and military strength and presence in Libya at the detriment of Dbeibah’s Government of National Unity in Tripolitania. Due to the precarious health of both leaders, they are often replaced at key political meetings by their likely successors, chosen from within their respective family circles, an opportunity to further postpone any plans for new presidential elections.

The assassination on February 3 at his residence in Zintan, Tripolitania, of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the son of Muammar Gaddafi, who had once designated him as his successor, has removed an influential figure capable of bridging the two main factions in the struggle for power in Libya. At the moment, there does not appear to be any intention to alter the status quo, which is based on the difficult management of local and tribal divisions that were once skillfully orchestrated by the Gaddafi regime.

Despite themselves, all political and economic partners have had to navigate this situation in an attempt to achieve their stated objectives.

Following the memorandum on the recognition of maritime borders in the southern Mediterranean signed with the Tripoli government in 2019, in direct opposition to similar plans by Greece and Egypt, Turkey is now negotiating with Benghazi, which does not recognize that agreement. This involves a 30% expansion of Turkey’s continental shelf at the expense of the area claimed by Cyprus and Greece, where work had already begun on developing a gas pipeline to provide a more efficient connection between the fields in the eastern Mediterranean and European markets. The interests at stake regarding areas designated for deep-sea fishing are also significant.

To bolster Turkey’s claims, the government in Ankara is funding and supporting the government in Tripoli. It is also consolidating its military presence in Tripolitania with a new military base in Misrata and a possible air base in Al-Watiyya, inland to the south of Sabrata.

Russia is pursuing two strategic objectives in Libya: the first involves continued support for Haftar’s government, which is necessary to maintain control over Cyrenaica and to strengthen the two key air bases at al-Khadim, 200 km east of Benghazi, and Matan As-Sarra in the desert near the border with Chad, serving as the primary logistical support for Russian military operations in Africa. Some reports indicate work being done on runways, depots, and various facilities, which underscore Russia’s strategic interest. The integration of Cyrenaica into Russia’s alliance system also involves military training, technical assistance, and the supply of weapons, all of which confirm Moscow’s strong interest in Libya.

The United Arab Emirates, for its part, is utilizing the remote Kufrah airport, 1,200 km southeast of Benghazi, as a base for supplying weapons and various types of materials to support the Sudanese paramilitary militias (RSF: Rapid Support Forces), which are in open armed conflict with the Sudanese armed forces, who in turn, are backed by Egypt, which recently carried out an airstrike against a convoy of weapons and fuel destined for the RSF.

The critical political and military issues have subsequently increased since the US became engaged in an exhausting mediation attempt between Tripoli and Bengasi, but at the moment they do not plan direct military involvement.

Underlying all this paid-for attention in addition to geostrategic plans is, fundamentally, the exploration, extraction, and transportation of high-quality hydrocarbons found underground in the desert and beneath the surface of the Libyan Sea.

Eni, too, had to navigate that web of agreements in an effort to secure the renewal of new extraction licenses.

In late January 2026, Eni obtained a modification to its agreement with NOC, the Libyan national oil company, aimed at securing a 9% increase in the Italian multinational’s share in exchange for a joint investment of $3.7 billion through long-term contracts. Naturally, other oil companies have also requested adjustments to their stakes and the duration of their concessions, given the substantial investments required, particularly for offshore facilities. In February, Eni announced that it had obtained a license for offshore exploration of Block O1, in the oil-rich province of Sirte covering 29,000 square kilometers in collaboration with QatarEnergy. Highly satisfied, Eni executives emphasized that the excellent synergy between Italian technology which has enabled the company to become the leading operator in the sector, with hydrocarbon production expected to reach approximately 162,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2025 and Qatar’s substantial economic strength, necessary for these investments, played a key role in the NOC’s decisions. In mid-March, Eni announced that the initial seismic surveys required to locate offshore fields had yielded very encouraging results.

The Italian middlemen and oil executives are all happy; but the suffering masses of migrants from the Libyan coast represent a massive human tragedy from which the capitalism of European states in search of cheap labor stands to gain.