THE COURSE OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM
Kategorie: Le cours du capitalisme mondial
Ten artykuł został opublikowany w:
Dostępne tłumaczenia:
- Angielski: THE COURSE OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM
- Włoski: IL CORSO DEL CAPITALISMO MONDIALE
Almost ten years after the UN, the OECD has also abandoned the presentation of industrial and manufacturing production indices in order to focus exclusively on GDP trends, which remain the only point of reference for a parasitic and decaying capitalism; now, only fictitious accumulation through speculation counts.
The United States, mired in a deindustrialization that has desertified the productive regions that once made American capitalism prosperous, now with a deep state and trade deficit, has stopped following the principles of liberalism. These principles, which characterized the entire post-war period, are now a way of operating on the world market that is no longer suited to times of deep crisis and commercial, financial, and productive conflict between states, relying instead on pure power relations, throwing the weight of their national markets onto the world market, but with the help of a still dominant military force.
The crisis of global capitalism continues to disrupt the rules and balance of power between imperialist powers. It pushes states into trade conflicts and, in some cases, even into open recourse to violence to reestablish their supremacy. The cases of the imperialist conflict between Russia, the US, and Europe are paradigmatic of this process towards total conflict. But this is a remedy worse than the disease. The inter-imperialist war being fought in Ukraine could ruin more than one national economy. The same applies to the United States: far from leading to a reindustrialization of the country, the economic policy pursued by the new administration may instead accelerate the crisis and lead to a disastrous financial collapse.
Before examining these points in more detail, we present our usual overview of the economic situation. However, this will be reduced, since, as already mentioned, the indices compiled by the OECD are no longer available. We therefore turned to the indices compiled by Eurostat, but these only cover Europe. However, they presented problems because they compile different types of indices, including unconventional indices in which the increase refers to the previous month rather than the same month of the previous year. Among all these indices, it was necessary to verify the correct ones by comparing them with the OECD indices.
We were able to retrieve the indices for the United States, but those for Japan, the United Kingdom, India, South Korea, and the other countries of America are missing. Let us consider inflation trends for the United States, Europe, and China. China has shown an almost deflationary curve since April 2023, reflecting the crisis of overproduction it is experiencing, which is currently manifesting itself in a trade war between the major car manufacturers.
As for the United States, there has been a slight increase in inflation since May 2025, rising from 2.4% to 2.9% in August. Due to the heavy customs duties imposed on a large number of imported products, inflation can only increase. To a certain extent, foreign companies exporting these products and American companies importing them will have to reduce their profits in order not to pass on the full cost of the tax to consumers.
However, with taxes ranging from 15% to 50% in the best case and 100% in the worst case, imported products will have to increase in price. Inflation of more than 3% is therefore to be expected. Currently, average inflation in Europe has stabilized at around 2.4%. In general, inflation in Europe ranges from less than 1% in France to 2.2% in Germany. In contrast, in the United Kingdom, which is outside the European Union, inflation remains very high, with all the difficulties this causes for the British working class, exceeding 4%.
Looking at the US industrial production indices, it can be seen that after a period of depression from March 2023 to November 2024, there is a slight recovery with increases of around 1%: the lowest point is 0.7% and the highest, in January 2025, is 1.4%. The tables below show that, based on the first eight months of the year, the increase is positive at a modest 0.8% compared to the peak reached in 2018, while in 2024 it was still negative at -0.4%. However, this seven-month recovery remains very modest.
Increases in US industrial production (percentage values)

US manufacturing production (percentage values)

A notable driver of industrial production is mining, mainly the extraction of gas and oil from shale. However, when it comes to manufacturing production, the data indicates that it is still below the 2007 peak, at -7.6%. In other words, for 18 years, manufacturing production in the United States, as in other major imperialist countries, has not emerged from the 2008-2009 recession, and there is little chance that the US government can do anything about it.
As for Germany, another major imperialist country, even though it is a medium-sized power like other European countries, it has been in full recession since 2019, with increases ranging from -3.4% in 2019 to -4.7% in 2024. The trend in monthly increases shows a long depression with a slight improvement in recent months, with a positive increase of 2.1% in July 2025. But comparing this increase with that of July 2024, when production fell by 5.4% year-on-year, shows that production is still in recession. And the situation is not likely to change, considering that the industry has lost 114,000 jobs since the beginning of the year. The main sectors of German industry, chemicals, machine tools, and the automotive sector, are under severe pressure from Chinese competition and American tariffs. The heart of German industry is being hit hard, and the German automotive industry, like that of other European countries, is in danger of disappearing.
The new German government wants to revive industrial production through major infrastructure projects, particularly in the transport sector. Years of cutbacks in this sector have left Germany with infrastructure that is not only obsolete but also inefficient. The old Teutonic precision of train timetables is no longer there, and the situation is worse than in Italy, which has seen an improvement in recent years. The communications infrastructure subsystem is also showing problems; the failure to expand to fiber optics while maintaining copper twisted pair connections results in mediocre internet connection performance. On the other hand, the German government has little debt compared to other European countries, and therefore has much more room for maneuver in this regard and can therefore make substantial investments. The military crisis in Europe and the need for rearmament by NATO member states has come at the most opportune moment; the government’s indication to increase the military budget will also be used as a stimulus for German industry.
Italy has also been in recession since 2019. The latest index for 2024 indicates -3%. The situation is even more critical when looking at past trends. However, there has been a slight improvement since February 2025, but the increases remain negative, meaning that production continues to decline, albeit to a lesser extent. Trump’s taxes can only exacerbate the situation.
Last in the series is France. The situation appears to be better; instead of being in a real recession, there is almost stagnation: +0.2% in 2022, +0.6% in 2023, and +0.2% again in 2024. And if we calculate the average of the indices for the first seven months of 2025, we get +0.4%. However, just like in other European countries, production is significantly lower than the peak reached in 2007: -11.5% for 2024 and -10% for 2025, but only over 7 months. If the next 5 months are negative, production will return to the 2024 level, or even lower.
The table below, compiled on the basis of Eurostat statistics, shows the increases in the various countries of the European Union, plus Turkey, from 2019 to 2024. The last two columns show the increases in 2024 compared to 2018 and 2007. Consider the last two columns in particular. It can be seen that all the old capitalist countries have production levels well below the peak reached in 2007 and also below those of 2018: after the great recession, the two years of recovery were 2017 and 2018. Among the old imperialist countries, only Belgium is an exception, thanks to the dynamic capitalism of Flanders.
Percentage increases in industrial production 2019-2024

Almost all Eastern European countries have high growth rates. Compared to 2007, we have: Poland +97.3%; Lithuania +66%; Estonia +37.7%; Latvia +23.3%. Another European country stands out, surprisingly Denmark with +34.1%. Further investigation is needed to understand the reason for this. Norway recorded +10% compared to 2018, but -5.5% compared to 2007, yet it is a major gas producer in Europe. Turkey, a non-European country, recorded a significant increase of 111%. This is a young capitalism that has become imperialist in Lenin’s sense.
Finally, some data on international trade. Exports from the main imperialist countries were tabulated from June 2024 to July 2025. China stands out from the others with increases of up to 12.5%. However, in recent months it has fallen to the average of the other countries with increases ranging from 4.5% to 7.1%. Most countries recorded negative increases until February 2025. Starting in May 2025, all countries emerged from recession, with increases returning to positive territory, some exceeding China, others slightly below, while China’s increases represented the average. It should be noted that these figures are expressed in constant dollars and therefore do not take inflation into account.
CONCLUSION
The current US administration, in line with its predecessor, aims to reindustrialize the United States and reduce the trade deficit. To this end, it intends to use the stick and play on currency devaluation, believing that tax cuts for the upper middle class will encourage them to invest, which is an illusion. Industrialists only make productive investments if they are sure they can profit from the sale of their goods, but the US and global markets are already saturated.
To subsidize tax cuts, the Trump administration needs to tax imported products, but the federal government’s deficit far exceeds the revenue that can be generated from this. And tax cuts only make the situation worse. The US public debt is becoming truly colossal, reaching at least $36 trillion today. As a result, the federal government’s financial needs are growing exponentially year after year. At the same time, the current administration’s economic policy is undermining confidence in the dollar, which has been the foundation of the global financial system since the end of World War II. To make the manufacturing industry more competitive, the government is pushing down the dollar, which has depreciated by about 10% against a basket of reference currencies since the beginning of the year. This translates into a 10% decline in US government bonds held by foreigners. However, over the last 10-15 years, foreign ownership of Treasury securities has been declining: from 60% before the great crisis of 2008-2009, it has fallen to the current 30%.
US economic policy only accentuates this mistrust. This was evident during the mini-crisis in April, when the dollar failed to play its role as a safe-haven currency as risky assets suffered on the stock market. And for the first time, there was a capital flight, just as in developing countries during a crisis. To avoid an increase in interest rates on long-term loans, which serve as a benchmark for interest on debt, the government is increasingly resorting to short-term loans. This makes lending even more risky, as loans must be renewed more often with ever-increasing amounts.
Under these circumstances, there will come a time when the US government will no longer be able to renew its debt on the world market. The federal government will then find itself bankrupt, inevitably leading to a massive bond crash that will spread to all nations, and the immense financial house of cards will collapse. Central banks will try to intervene as they did in 2008-2009, but at the end of this upheaval, they will not be able to regain control of the situation.
The future of capitalism is a crisis worse than that of 1929. And it can only come out of it with a new terrible world war that will destroy all surpluses, settle all outstanding accounts, and redefine the “borders of the world.”
But this is not the solution for the proletariat, nor for humanity as a whole. The future of humanity must not be this, we are certain of that. The old Mole continues inexorably with its great work of digging to bring the world proletariat back on the track of revolution!