The “Pact for the Factory”: concertation to stifle workers’ struggle

The corporatist model of relations between trade unions, employers, and the state, which has long inspired so-called “concertation,” had already been initiated by the General Confederation of Labor in the immediate aftermath of the First World War. It was brought to completion and made the rule with the advent of fascism, following the defeats suffered by the proletarian movement and the destruction of its organizations, which had been led to capitulation by the counterrevolutionary leadership that had held sway until then.

The corporations brought together representatives of the trade union, the employers, and the State. They became part of the state machine and served as the clearing house in which concertation took place (precisely!), with the aim of preventing conflicts between wage earners and capital. A result that could not always be achieved, however, sometimes forcing even the fascist trade union, under pressure from the proletariat, to take up conflicts in defense of workers’ demands. Indeed, there can never be a regime that can abolish class struggle by decree.

The organizations were then rebuilt after the Second World War with no break in continuity with fascist trade unionism, under the aegis of the parties of the Resistance (CLN), the Church, and American and Russian imperialism (Pact of Rome of June 3, 1944). The aim was to immediately rein in the proletariat, which, in the tragic conditions in which it found itself, could have set about its economic defense independently, as had been shown in the strikes in northern Italy in ’43, later those of the agricultural laborers in Puglia, and then the struggles in the South that had led to the reconstitution of the red CGL in Naples. In effect refusing the terrible sacrifices demanded for postwar reconstruction, to which the false communist and socialist Parties intended to bend it.

In our organ, “Battaglia Comunista,” we then described the resurrected CGIL, which had emerged from the Pact of Rome (which added the I, standing for “Italian”), as an organization “tailored to Mussolini’s model” (“The Trade Union Splits in Italy” — May 1949).

This founding characteristic of the CGIL, reborn after the war, has revealed itself ever more clearly as the period of economic recovery and the scope for substantial action in support of workers’ demands have drawn to a close. As capitalism moved toward an ever deeper crisis, a policy of increasingly abandoning the defense of workers’ conditions and accepting the sacrifices imposed in the name of the “national economy” was forced upon the collaborationist unions.

In a corporatist vein, as early as 1983, with the bargaining round about to begin and in order to establish from the outset the conditions under which the platforms of demands would be drawn up, an agreement was signed between the Government, CGIL–CISL–UIL, and Confindustria, entitled “Comprehensive Protocol of Agreement on Labor Costs,” in which, while the government undertook to contain the tax burden on wages, the trade union undertook to concede flexibility in working hours, mobility between companies, part-time and fixed-term employment, and stricter controls on absenteeism. Even the compatible limits on wage increases were set, and these had to be respected in the platforms of demands.

Subsequently, faced with the growth of rank-and-file unionism, which had already emerged as a reaction to confederal collaborationism in public employment and the services (hospital workers, railway and tram workers, flight attendants, school workers, employees of the State and local authorities, etc.), the need arose to block the development of these movements in industry as well and to lock in the Confederations’ representative role, establishing them as the sole interlocutor designated to represent the workers.

In June 2011 and January 2014, agreements were drawn up between Confindustria and the confederal unions, establishing as the benchmark for representation the weighted average of the membership figure that each company would supply on the basis of the authorizations signed by each worker for payroll deduction of union dues for payroll deduction of union dues, and the votes obtained in elections to the unitary workplace union bodies (RSU). Only the trade union organizations that signed these agreements — concluded with the three confederations — would be entitled to represent the workers. Thus, to be considered “representative” (so-called “certified representation”), the rank-and-file organizations opposed to the confederal line would have had to sign the agreements and accept the system of payroll deduction of union dues, making their membership data known and thereby exposing their members to repression by the employers. It should be noted that, for precisely this reason, our Party firmly opposed the authorization system — that is, joining the union through the boss — from the moment it was introduced, insisting on direct membership.

Thus concertation between the unions and Confindustria arrives at the agreement of February 28, 2018, which defines the so-called “Pact for the Factory.”

Here, the preamble declares the intention to pursue “balanced governance of collective bargaining” and “increased productivity in enterprises,” in order to “close the competitiveness gap and the disparities that persist relative to the other major competing economies.” It would therefore be a matter of establishing “an autonomous, innovative, and participatory model of industrial relations that supports the competitiveness of sectors and production chains.” It should be noted that, when “productivity” is spoken of, this must be understood as “greater exploitation” of wage labor.

And so we arrive at the question of representation, reaffirmed in the terms already defined in the previous agreements to prevent so-called “contractual dumping,” that is, agreements concluded with parties “without certified representation.”

The national collective agreement “will retain its function as a regulator of industrial relations […] directing company-level agreements […] toward the recognition of pay provisions tied to real and agreed targets for growth in company productivity.”

The agreement then addressed other points, likewise guided by collaboration aimed at increasing company productivity and competitiveness, which we will not comment on here.

What we want to bring out is the attempt to safeguard and assert the exclusivity of trade union action managed by the Confederations, against any prospect of the formation and growth from below of trade union organizations that oppose the confederal line, and, by appealing to the workers’ rank and file, win its support and call on it to mobilize, breaking the pact of collaboration established by the confederal unions with the employers on the opposing side and with the State that safeguards their interests.

And so, remembering the struggles over workers’ demands in the years of economic recovery, we find that bargaining rounds proceed quietly, even for the traditionally strongest and most combative groups of workers, such as metalworkers. The platforms drawn up in the name of “compatibility” are presented in workplaces in an unobtrusive manner, and the few strikes are a formulaic ritual that involves the workers in the sector to no great extent, still less in solidarity with other groups of workers who are also awaiting ratification of their agreements. The conclusion of the negotiations, on the terms provided for by concertation, also takes place without fanfare. Nor does ratification any longer follow a real “consultation of the rank and file,” which we already knew was steered toward securing approval, but which nevertheless allowed dissent to be expressed in factory assemblies, leading in some cases to outright rejection.

It will not, however, be possible to stop class struggle through the pacts and dozens of agreements that the confederal unions proceed to establish in order to assure Capital of social peace. Capitalism, moving toward a structural crisis, will once again bring the working class to repudiate all the pacts made at its expense and the forums for concertation.

By rebuilding its organizations of economic defense and finding its political leadership once again in the Communist Party, the working class will again express its full potential for action. In this case, “representativeness” will not need to be “certified,” but will be imposed by the strength expressed by the genuinely class-based organization.